America’s Next Role in Libya: Two Scenarios to ‘Reengage’

The administration of outgoing US President Donald Trump approached the Libyan crisis from the perspective of “disengagement” and was content to monitor regional and international roles and their effects on Libyan competitors, be it the “reconciliation” government whose popularity on the ground it has eroded significantly and now depends for its survival mainly on international and Western support; Or the camp of retired Major General Khalifa Haftar, who has adopted contradictory agendas, drawing on his accumulated political experience since his presence in “Langley”, the headquarters of the CIA three decades ago. However, the American approach registered a notable paradox in April 2019, following Trump’s contact with Haftar, and the hesitation over the support of the former to the latter – in which it was later denied by White House officials – amid his campaign to “conquer Tripoli” from the beginning of the same month. Days before the date of the “inclusive national conference” was scheduled to take place under the Libyan national and international efforts and arrangements that lasted for about two years before the attack. This policy was very well received by Trump’s allies in the region, for its consistency with the nature of his intervention in the Libyan crisis. Although the US State Department has repeatedly declared backing the “reconciliation” government, Trump’s awkward behavior has strengthened the positions of Haftar and the regional parties that support him, and has avoided accepting a political settlement preceded by a comprehensive ceasefire.

Turkey’s entry, militarily, throughout the Libyan crisis, predicted the existence of an American green light to reach the brink of open war, before the United States announced in the middle of this year its support for a ceasefire. and will escalate its tone of warning against foreign military intervention in Libya (especially since August). 2020), and groups in the U.S. House of Representatives are increasing pressure on Trump, stunned by his electoral defeat, before the middle of this month to take action to reduce major violations of the decision to ban arms exports to Libya, ensure that American weapons are not used in the ongoing conflict in the country and impose trade sanctions on the countries that were violated This decision, led by Russia, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates, according to a speech by a group of representatives headed by Cory Booker.
As for the administration of the president-elect of the United States, Joe Biden, it is likely that it seeks to reconnect with the Libyan dossier in a broader context, considering Russia and its policies as the “greatest enemy” of American interests in the world, and also in Libya. However, the momentum of the American role, especially in its early stages, depends on the degree to which European parties have adopted a coherent “Libyan” policy. In this context, there are several noteworthy comments, including that the president-elect had a famous position on Libya when he was former Vice President Barack Obama. He was the subject of disagreement with Hillary Clinton, the secretary of state in the same administration and the Democratic candidate after that, and his tenets were opposition to intervention in Libya, which Biden saw, speaking to “CBS” in mid-June. of 2016, said that with the departure of Muammar Gaddafi it became “divided and a breeding ground for extremism”, considering that “the United States should not resort to the use of force (in Libya or anywhere else) except in the in case your interests or allies are threatened. direct. ”

The Biden administration may move toward a more serious policy to make up for the American absence.

While the new president is expected to be absorbed by at least 80% in American domestic affairs, it is not until the spring of 2021 that, for practical reasons, his actual involvement in broader Middle East politics is expected. Libya in particular until spring 2021. In this context, it is assumed that the Biden administration tends to support the efforts of the United Nations. To resolve the crisis and ensure the smooth flow of the current path leading to the holding of national elections in December 2021, according to the agreement of the Libyan parties this November, especially that “a stable Libya” is in the interest of greater participation of States United in regional affairs and gas exploration and exploitation issues, In line with a foreign policy that recalls long-term interests.
In general, there are two main scenarios for Biden’s approach to the Libyan dossier: the first is to trace Obama’s reservations about a strong American commitment to Libya, given that it is a matter of concern for the European ally in the first place. As such, Biden is expected to continue a somewhat cautious policy toward any new military intervention and to replace that push with a strong diplomatic track. As for the second scenario, which is more compact, the Biden administration will tend towards a more serious policy to compensate for the American absence, and the consequent growth of the influence of international and regional powers in the Libyan record, and the ineffectiveness of the policy of Trump by leaving room for the interventions of these forces without reservation. And taking advantage of Washington’s position as the only party that can address all parties to the crisis. This scenario is reinforced by the fact that Libya is one of the hot spots of an expected, and even inevitable, US-Turkish confrontation after Turkey played the role of collusion in favor of the Trump administration in many US archives in the African continent (as in the Sahel region, Somalia and Libya). It is a role that will be fully recalibrated or considered under the Biden administration, despite the positive signals expressed by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan during his congratulations to the president-elect, and his chancellor Mevlut Cavusoglu stating that there are many opportunities to help improve bilateral relations, especially their cooperation in “Ending the conflict in Syria and Libya.” In the advanced context, Greek Prime Minister Kyriako Mitsotakis expected a greater commitment from the Biden administration to ease tensions in the eastern Mediterranean, and at the heart was the crisis of delimitation of the Turkish-Libyan maritime borders.
With regard to the parties’ approach to the crisis with the new administration, the initiative of the head of Al-Wefaq, Fayez Al-Sarraj, to send a hasty message to Biden, in which he congratulates him and expresses his aspiration to work, stands out. together “to achieve a democratic civil state in Libya”, in a preventive step to hope that Al-Sarraj will have a new role in the future, after withdrawing his resignation, which he promised last October, and at the same time suggest that the Libyan parties sought to preserve the existing balance until the last possible moment. As for Haftar, who received an exaggerated estimate of his ability to resolve the conflict in Libya, it was based on the close relations with Trump and the interests of the American oil companies still operating in Libya (the most important of which is the Global Strategic Energy in Texas), and capitalized on the loopholes of Washington’s dual focus on the Libyan crisis. What observers saw as a disparity in Trump’s support for Haftar in exchange for the defense and foreign ministries support for “reconciliation.” However, under the Biden administration, the room for maneuver vis-à-vis Haftar will be reduced, except in the event that he is formulated a new role with regional support first, and perhaps with high conditions in the scenario of his role as collateral. security stability in the ongoing political settlement process.
In the end, in what has become an example of a state crisis that essentially depends on the connections of local actors with others, regionally and internationally, the Libyan crisis is expected to witness a solution under the Biden administration, including if that expectation continues to depend on the positions of the internal parties, which do not seem to have decided to give the Libyan people’s elections a chance. Beyond the political and military polarizations, it appreciates the erosion of its assets with the Libyans and the exposure of its external entanglements that put citizens at the bottom of the priorities of their agendas.

Subscribe to «News» on YouTube here