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The narrative of this confusion in the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the Brotherhood derives its energy from the repercussions of the Western, Islamic, Arab and, finally, the Gulf situation, in a logical correlation of everything that seemed illogical.
Far from arguing with guilt about who initiated the betrayal; The common interests that were drawn between hearts and covered with the mantle of piety, deviated from their path in certain situations, which gave rise to certain results, which should be examined in the most prominent, contrary to the rule of “What finally happens, is written first.”
The Muslim Brotherhood appeared in the third Saudi state, with an editorial in the newspaper Umm al-Qura, under the title “Welcome”, at the reception of the group’s general guide, Hassan al-Banna, in mid-March 1936, whose event was overshadowed by media coverage. The occasion of the Hajj itself, until he held a conference in which he called to “return to Islam again”, until some expected a “discontent” that was, for Saudi Arabia, null on the stage of the attendees hugging Banna , and his eagerness to invite the group at that time.
From here, the indicators of the alliance with Saudi Arabia drew major lines of inflection. Before this date, it was rare for two contradictory projects to come together in a melting pot, were it not for the need for common interests and destinies, which heralded coming threats whose vision and details were limited to the British intelligence services, and their fear of lose the current ally. Saudi Arabia, and its ideal alternative is the Muslim Brotherhood.
Two and a half decades after the visit to Al-Banna, procedural reactions took place on the ground to avoid British fear and prepare for its optimal ambitions. After that, Al-Banna’s secretary and Al-Azhar graduate Manna Al-Qattan moved to Saudi Arabia in 1953 and was appointed director of the Higher Judicial Institute, and he was given comprehensive powers that allowed him to establish the Muslim World League, the Islamic Development Bank, the Muslim Youth World Assembly and other institutions called “Brotherhood institutions”. ” Then.
This strange merger took place in compelling geopolitical circumstances. One of their goals was to create an “Islamic alliance” against “Arab nationalism” under the leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser, the hated enemy of Saudi Arabia, and the “Brotherhood” that led thousands to their prisons, so that finally this alliance arose out of hostility. Personal, more than the motives of the central issues under the crane of Islam.
In the local future, King Faisal bin Abdul Aziz found in the “Brotherhood” an opportunity to form a counterweight to Wahhabi ideology, despite his alliance with him to overthrow his brother, King Saud. Similarly, the price of the warm feelings was al-Banna’s embrace first, and the subsequent empowerment of the Brotherhood’s organizational activity at its new foothold, and in an ongoing conflict scenario that threatens the interests of both parties, and another deferred from whose income the latter earns first.
However, the Saudis flocked to build it, and children flock to the candy vendors, thinking that it will be like a Wahhabi drum that always responds to the hand of the king beating it, not an international organization with (sovereign) ambitions. ) incompatible in methodology and style for the drum, in addition to being prepared in advance within the British project to control. The current governing path and its long-term alternatives. Hence, jurisprudence necessarily required that the character of the local branch of the “Brotherhood” appear as “Salafist” in the analogy of the absolute prevailing theory for some time.
The Brotherhood has adopted a “cloaking” strategy that is invisible to the Saudi ally. His new home has made him a major source of funding for international organizations. It stood out for sensitive institutions like education and the judiciary. It penetrated well into decision-making centers. He built a popular base across the country. It created bridges of communication with the western exterior and revived its lines with the Arab ocean. Consequently, he could climb a step to change the characteristics of the relationship with Saudi Arabia, from an ally to a partner. And to support the decision to take it locally and abroad. It then stands out for the purpose of achieving the ultimate goal of controlling the Muslim holy sites, at any cost, even if it is the entire capital.
The painful strikes continued from the point of the Gulf War and intensified along with intense procedural actions such as the organization of a popular protest led by Salman al-Awda in 1994.
The Brotherhood plant grew and multiplied, until six decades after it was sown, it became a forest of trees stronger and stronger than the trunk of a palm tree. Consequently, the “Brotherhood” chose the most difficult moment for a clash of interests by leaving the Saudi squad in the Second Gulf War in 1990, in line with the interests of the international organization, and inaugurating a new strategy that got rid of his borrowed masks and boring camouflage methods, to appear clearer and more consistent with the main project.
At that point, each side had to rationalize its hostile arguments in preparation for the elimination of the other. Saudi Arabia, in the most complex military circumstance, was disappointed by those who “believed in their fear and satiated their hunger”, while the memory of the “Brotherhood” immortalized in the collective mindset known to protect Saudi Arabia from external danger and achieve local balance. However, this reproach of the damages is plunged into the head with the logic of ‘ego or the flood’ »In an arena of conflict, the parties cling to the inevitability of being alone for a single gentleman.
The painful strikes continued from the point of the Gulf War and intensified, along with intense procedural actions, such as the organization of a popular protest led by Salman Al-Awda in 1994, two years after the “speech of demands” presented to the king. Fahd bin Abdulaziz, in 1991, on reforms in the Saudi regimes. This was an escalation, in 1993, that broke the barriers of Saudi politics by establishing political entities with human rights coverage. At that time, Al-Tashfuf found a way to paint his most beautiful paintings on the traits of Wahhabism domesticated by the scene of the Brotherhood flame that rose around the ice of the ruling family, until he reached the taboo of demanding replacement. of the absolute monarchy for a constitutional monarchy, in a simulation of the British system of government “The king prevails and does not rule”, and in its energy balance Rays of sedition that the sun does not set.
In conclusion, although it seems very, very sterile from the point of view of freeing up interests and distributing them in equal proportions to two parties adhering to the doctrine of “I or the flood” until now, because it gave birth to the total conviction that one must displace the other, then the transcendence of the historical wounds did not achieve a structural fusion of two parties with the aim of separately leading the “world”. Sunni ”and the sanctities of Muslims, neither money nor gifts can violate the foundations of the Qur’an to achieve an arbitrary familiarity equivalent to what God intended it to be.
It is the events and transformations that reinforce this idea, not the deduction and calculation of the facts. The two sides of the conflict were reinforced by their conviction in the lack of association and the inevitability of eliminating the other, which was reinforced by the wave of the “Arab Spring” in 2011, in light of the pioneering role of the international organization. of the “Brotherhood”, backed by the glories of the Ottoman state in its modern face of Brotherhood, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who was Guaranteed that the bells of history will ring the pierced eardrum of Saudi Arabia, and will draw attention to the stage of the fall of the first country by executing its leader on the heads of the martyrs in Istanbul.
For Saudi Arabia, this stormy spring event pushed it to stain its old revolutions and its bleeding wounds, by aborting the wellspring of the bastion in which the “Brotherhood” paid for some seven decades as a sacrifice for the disappointed arrival to the Egyptian presidency.
Saudi Arabia managed to exact revenge with the scene of its first fall. But his fear of backlash led him to shut the door shut on the fringes of subtopics in local depth, and fill some of the constant concerns about the future of existence by classifying the “Brotherhood” as a “terrorist group” in 2014, with the creation of a “hero” and the loan of “heroism” to Muhammad bin Salman. To lead an all-out battle against the group “more dangerous than Iran”, as he said and promised to destroy it forever. The Brotherhood’s preaching, sheik, civil, political and media symbols were stopped, while the secretive nature of the group’s activity has preserved the integrity of many of the bases inside today.
Even public libraries and educational institutions, which included Al-Banna and Sayed Qutb’s books for decades, lacked the Brotherhood’s ink, and there was nothing left on their shelves and platforms except for the sad endings on Al’s display. -Jazeera, supported by the solidarity of Western organizations and media, in contrast to the hegemony of the Saudi steps supported by Western governments.
Suddenly, the international organization broke its media silence, four years after its Saudi branch was uprooted and a year ago of boycotting and terrorizing Qatar in 2017 CE, to finally say in front of Saudi Arabia and Bin Salman: “Countries hit the nail from his coffin when they throw people falsely, kill civilians, besiege brothers and surrender Jerusalem and strengthening relations with the Zionists.
Bin Salman didn’t mind at the time threatening the “nail”, or giving in to the “ego or the flood” doctrine. It has only one eyelid. We are about 3 years away. Perhaps the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, 5 months after threatening the nail, and deliberately melting it in the sewers of Turkey Symbolizing the end that Saudi Arabia put for the “Brotherhood”.
While some believe that the conflict (from the perspective of a Brotherhood) has not yet begun and will not end without projecting the ideal image of bin Salman’s present Ottoman history, based on current data and relying on the achievements of the alliance. history with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which allowed the group to have political and military influence and power, and economically speaking, until now it is really a “nail in the coffin of the kingdom”.
Yemeni journalist
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