Is Lebanon’s neutrality a choice or just a wish?



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“Of course, the choice is something different to be desired, even if it seems very close. There is no choice in the impossible. If we claim that our choice fell on him, others will make fun of us. Otherwise, we can expect something impossible, like eternity, for example. (…) The subject of desire can be things that we cannot in any way achieve by ourselves (…); Otherwise, the choice cannot fall on things like this, but on things that we think we are capable of achieving by ourselves ”(Aristotle, in Ethics) [SPN].

“Demands are not met by illusions, but the world is conquered by victory” (from a poem by the poet Ahmad Shawqi, sung by Umm Kulthum)
A little logic before embarking on politics, otherwise it will not be possible to understand what I will say in the following lines. If the possible (that is, the impossible) is what it is capable of being, then it has a part of realization in reality, then the impossible (that is, the impossible) is what it is not capable of being, and does not have. participation to be reached in reality. But if the impossible is what cannot exist, then the improbable is what can exist, but has a small share in being realized in reality. And that’s the nebulous possibility that while it is possible, it may never exist and is therefore closer to a desire than a choice.
In fact, the question of Lebanon’s neutrality, which is political, is rational rather than political. This is because before we want a neutral Lebanon, we have to ask ourselves if it is possible for Lebanon to be neutral. If it can be, do you have the means to achieve it? Then this raises the question of possibility. According to Aristotelian logic, is Lebanon’s “neutrality” an option within reach, or is it just a hope that has no way of achieving it?
Amid the chaos plaguing their ranks across the region, is Lebanon’s “neutrality”, in the eyes of the Lebanese, with its different sects and tendencies, an option and therefore an acceptable inclusive value for everybody? Or is it simply a wish that a part of the Lebanese people want, in which case they must confront another part of the Lebanese that they do not want?

Swiss lesson
Before asking about the neutrality of Lebanon, it is necessary to turn to the example of Switzerland. Switzerland is the model country of neutrality, and in light of the lessons we can draw from this country, the question of the neutrality of Lebanon is raised.
During the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648), Switzerland managed to remain neutral. However, it failed to preserve this neutrality, except after having built an army of 36,000 combatants, thus launching the concept of “armed neutrality” and inaugurating what will be called – after the French Revolution – a “national army.” Switzerland’s neutrality was not recognized until after the end of this war, and in accordance with the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) that ended the Thirty Years’ War. The neutrality of Switzerland was recognized by the main European countries, as indicated in the Westphalian Agreement, as a “factor of balance and peace”, except in the Institutes of Vienna (1815) which ended the Napoleonic Wars.
Although Napoleon Bonaparte forced the Swiss to join his army during his campaign against Russia (1812), Switzerland again declared its neutrality and inviolability of its lands, after Napoleon’s defeat at Leipzig (1813), and the Paris Agreement (1815) He recognized this declaration which was approved in the year He himself at the Congress of Vienna. And when, during the First World War, Switzerland fell between the two conflicting blocs in this war, it managed to activate its neutrality, and it also managed to reactivate this neutrality during the Second World War. But when Hitler announced that he would invade Switzerland, the Swiss government quickly modernized its army in preparation for war. It is known that Hitler did not invade Switzerland, for reasons that cannot be mentioned here, and we are pleased to stress that Switzerland has taken all the necessary preparations and measures to deal with the dangers that threaten it.
What lessons can be learned from the Swiss lesson? The first lesson is that neutrality does not become a politically feasible option unless those who demand neutrality in the country in question have succeeded in making neutrality a national motto and a common demand in which all citizens of the country agree. agreement, and in this case only neutrality becomes a political approach pursued by the State, it becomes a political option. Realizable. In fact, Lebanon did not meet this condition. Perhaps there was a desire for neutrality among many Lebanese (and of all sects), but it did not become a national slogan, and it is still within the bounds of hope.
Adherence to this desire and its adoption is a sine qua non, but it is not enough. This is because neutrality does not depend on good intentions, but requires, as the history of Switzerland shows, creating a strong army to reinforce it and an “armed will” to protect it and impose it on enemies, whether in the country. or abroad. This condition was also not met for Lebanon.
As Swiss history informs us, “internal will” alone is not sufficient to enforce Lebanon’s neutrality, but must also have the approval of its closest neighbors (regionally: Israel, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran) and the far away (the world). Likewise, it is an indispensable condition that the consent of the neighbors is confirmed in agreements that stipulate it. This condition was also not met for Lebanon.
Finally, it should be noted that Switzerland’s neutrality has never been an end in itself. It is not among the goals of the constitution, which states that the goal of neutrality is independence, not neutrality for the sake of neutrality (Article 2 and Article 173 of the Swiss Constitution). Since independence is the ultimate goal, neutrality is no longer just a means to safeguard independence. This is also a condition not available for Lebanon!
If any of those conditions necessary to achieve the option of neutrality is not available to Lebanon, then what good is a strong and strong voice today to make it a national motto, which is in fact nothing more than a sincere wish?
Of course, the first thing that comes to mind is that when the flag of neutrality is raised, what is meant by that is to “neutralize” the effects of Hezbollah’s presence in Lebanon. On the lifting of the siege imposed on legitimacy and free patriotic decision ”, referring by name to Hezbollah, which accuses it of“ waging wars and dragging Lebanon with it in Syria and Yemen … ”“ Lebanon’s neutrality, which it is part of its essence, now it is destroyed “.
Of course, the “liberation” of Lebanon from Hezbollah’s victory is not new. On the contrary, what is new in the matter is its strong comeback when the slogan of the disarmament of Hezbollah was raised, for the first time, at the end of May, after seven months of demonstrations. I don’t know if a detailed explanation can be given. But it seems to me that, to give an answer, we must move from the purely Lebanese domain to the broader regional and international domain, where the activation of the demand for neutrality falls. Those who want to be neutral hope to include their wish / desire to “neutralize” the power of Hezbollah and cut their nails, as part of the regional / international effort that seeks to “neutralize” Iranian influence in the region and cut Iran’s nails. So “hopefully” your wish will come true by achieving regional security. Hope is weak, of course; But is there any other door that can be opened for them?
Neutrality is unreasonable and contradictory, and Lebanon cannot obtain it, because even if it wanted to be “neutral”, it would not be seen as neutral and would be forced to align itself with one of the regional axes in conflict.

* Lebanese thinkers and academics

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