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Who do I call if I want to speak to Europe? The famous phrase attributed (apparently improperly) to former Secretary of State Kissinger may be useful these days for President-elect Joe Biden.
The answer today should be unequivocally one: the President of the Commission, Von der Leyen. Without detracting from the institutional role played by the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, and by the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, it is precisely the Commission that is currently exercising the greatest impetus and has assumed a series of challenges where it would be important to find a transatlantic convergence immediately.
By immediately opening dialogue with Brussels, Biden would give a strong signal, bringing the EU back to the center after a long period in which the games were played mainly by the strongest member states (Germany and France in primis).
Of course, the new American administration has already contacted the world’s top leaders. In Europe, with few exceptions in the Visegrad area, heads of state and government breathed a sigh of relief at the outcome of the elections and rushed to congratulate Biden.
President Von der Leyen, following the message of good wishes sent shortly after the announcement by the US media that the fateful threshold of 270 votes had been exceeded, in recent days he delivered a speech at the annual conference of accredited ambassadors before the EU in which he declares himself ready to rebuild the transatlantic partnership, severely weakened by the continuous clashes during the Trump administration. In fact, in recent years, Europe was viewed by Washington more as an economic and commercial competitor than an ally, and this has led to a series of heated controversies. It is not a coincidence that Trump has openly supported disintegrating pressures from the Union, starting with Brexit.
However, it would be a mistake to think that, after the Trumpian hiatus, the divisions between Europe and the United States will heal quickly. In fact, there are many issues on which, for some time, we have had different, if not opposite, views. In addition, not infrequently Trump has limited himself to making his own and reiterating the positions already expressed by the Obama administration (of course, adding his own, but more in form than in substance).
The main open issues concern international trade (the relaunch of the WTO, tariffs on steel and aluminum, other mutually applied tariffs for subsidies to Airbus and Boeing and those threatened on German automobiles), the challenge by the technology supremacy with China (especially regarding the choice of platform for the transition to 5G), the taxation of the American web giants and the sword of Damocles (much desired by Commissioner Breton) of a new policy of containment towards them, the energy transition, data transfer.
Even in terms of “economic” foreign policy there are many problems to be solved: from the ever-open question of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline (which is also a source of division within Europe) to the continuous attempts to assert a geopolitical sovereignty of the break free from the traditional US umbrella (take common positions vis-à-vis foreign investment, counteract the distorting effects caused by foreign subsidies in the single market, increase the role of the euro as a reference currency, etc.).
On all of these issues, Biden’s position is unlikely to reverse what we’ve seen thus far. Even in the game where the most glaring differences are expected from Trump – the climate game – the United States could make more ambitious commitments and will surely give its support to the Treaty of Paris, but it would be naive to expect a crushing of European positions. A fortiori, we cannot expect major changes in the defense of American interests, from online platforms to the clash of fees for subsidies to Boeing and Airbus.
However, Biden would be brave and forward-looking if he recognized a privileged role for the Commission in the dialogue with Member States. The interlocutors, a little if you find them and a little if you choose them. Strengthening the EU, making it a reference partner, would also send a strong signal regarding the return to the method of multilateralism, after four years in which economic and trade relations were based mainly on bilateral terms, as if it were always and only a zero sum game. And it would help progress within the Union, at a time of great and obvious difficulties, which not only arises from the flagrant confrontation with Poland and Hungary over the rule of law.
What would Biden win? It could bring home a short and long term result. In the short term, giving encouragement to the EU and the multilateral system in general could help it better play its main geopolitical game, namely that of China.
The EU would be a precious ally and an important interlocutor, with whom to play on the shore, also to curb the temptations of member states to establish ever closer bilateral relations with Beijing (up to 18 EU states have already signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Beijing on the New Silk Road). In addition, it would allow the US to counteract the isolationist pressures that also exist in Europe: in recent days, Emmanuel Macron has called for an acceleration in the construction of Europe, but disconnected it from the relationship with the US, liquidating the specialty of transatlantic relations. as “a historical contradiction”.
Then, in the long term, Biden could make a decisive contribution to change the destiny of Europe and the entire world. In presenting the foreign policy agenda, he made it unequivocally clear that he intends to reposition the United States at the head of liberal democracies in the new world order. If, therefore, the immediate advantages in the consolidation of the transatlantic relationship may be limited, in perspective it is a question of rebuilding, on new foundations and in a different world, a solid relationship based on the perception of a history and a common interest, beyond reality. individual topics on which there may be different points of view. In the framework of a renewed strategic alliance, the resolution of current differences would also be infinitely easier.
As Doc Brown (the legendary Back to the Future professor) would say, Biden’s next steps will tell us whether he will be a president who looks to the short term and accepts the objective reduction of Washington’s global role, or whether he will be able to think “about four dimensions “. .
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