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Finding the truth is difficult. We need to take a step back, or perhaps more than one. It is in the days of late February, when northern Italy faces the first outbreaks of coronavirus. The eyes of Palazzo Chigi and the Ministry of Health are focused on a dozen municipalities in the Lodigiano area and a small town in the province of Padua, Vo ‘Euganeo. That’s where Adriano Trevisan comes from, a 78-year-old pensioner from Padua, originally from Monselice. He was admitted to the intensive care unit at Schiavonia hospital but the doctors treating him could do nothing to save him. His condition immediately seemed critical. On the night of February 21 (it was not yet 11 at night) he took his last breath. From that moment on, the contagion curve, in Lombardy and Veneto, will begin to increase dramatically. To some extent, they will go hand in hand, then the curves will recede. The Region led by the governor Luca zaia, blatantly breaking with government guidelines, it will undertake an aggressive policy to stop infections. A line that will see its cornerstone in tracking infections through nasopharyngeal swabs.
Who is behind this line is now impossible to say. First Andrea Crisanti, Professor of Microbiology at the University of Padua, had taken all the credit. He had even been renamed the “dad” of the Vo ‘model. Definition that made the leaders of the Region nervous. As we had already written in the Giornale.it Last May, an internal struggle has been waged in the Venetian health sector for months to attribute the merits of a miracle (recognized throughout the world) that not only immediately stopped the spread of infections but even freed the entire “area” red “in the Euganean hills of the coronavirus nightmare. “The credit goes to my team – Zaia has always wanted to reiterate – Crisanti came later”. As later rebuilt in Coronavirus Black Book, now in the first reprint (click here), the discontent of the experts led by general manager Domenico Mantoan has deep roots, at least since the virologist arrived from Imperial College London it began to be omnipresent in newspapers, talk shows and programs radio. . “We had been prepared for a month thanks to the doctor Francesca Russo, a woman from Catania who heads the Department of Prevention “, leaked months ago from the entourage of the governor of the Northern League.
Overflowing a jar already full of resentment was a study that recently appeared in the scientific journal Nature. It was Crisanti himself who signed it, accused of having attributed the paternity of the strategy used to “cushion” all the Vo ‘and then applied by Zaia throughout the region. In the face of what many have experienced as an affront, Russo took a pencil and paper and wrote to Nature to tell another version of the events. In the letter, which Bruno Vespa relates in his book Because Italy loved Mussolini (Mondadori), no half terms are used: “The publication has altered the facts, distorting reality and mystifying what happened to Vo ‘. All relevant decisions about how to deal with the outbreak originated in the Schiavonia hospital, where the first two patients resident in Vo ‘were admitted. positive for Sars-CoV-2, and were hired by the President of the Veneto Region in agreement with the Department of Prevention and Public Health of the Region and with the health authorities of the Ulss 6 Euganea Company. All of this, therefore, he specified, happened even before the Vo ‘study was conceived. “. In fact, the director of the Prevention Department recalled that “The swabs began after the hospital had already been evacuated and after the isolation and confinement of the Municipality of Vo ‘was ordered” is that “the lock was still in progress at the time of the second sample”.
A real media bomb. For Russo, in fact, many of the facts denounced in the Crisanti investigation (paid for by Zaia with an endowment of 150 thousand euros) would not correspond to the truth. To begin with, it would not be true that two surveys of Vo ‘residents were conducted less than two weeks apart to investigate the population’s exposure to Covid-19 before and after the emergency shutdown. How would it not be true that the study “guided the strategy adopted by the Veneto Region” and then what “this strategy of test and trace had a significant impact on the course of the epidemic in Veneto compared to other Italian regions “. “The case of Vo ‘- it is Russo’s final push – had minimal strategic impact on the Veneto region’s approach to treating theepidemic, since it counts, so far, only 5 deaths and 83 positive cases in the municipality, while other outbreaks have broken out simultaneously in much larger communities and the test and trace it was already in place “.
