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by Antonio Gaito – “Atalanta not on the day, “” neglected defense “,” did not go out on the field “, due to the victory of Napoli, a large part of the sports press has taken refuge in a series of recurring banalities when one does not enter the history of the game from a tactical point of view. Faced with the physical and mental aspect, which also has its value, Napoli knocked down Atalanta on a tactical level, almost distorting themselves to better face Gasperini’s team. And the 4-2-3-1, studied since last year and built on the few occasions in summer, goes precisely in the direction of certain rivals who – in Europe, but for some years also in Italy – have taken many phases of the game, starting with ultra-offensive pressure or across the court. There have been plenty of tricks from Gattuso, nullifying an opponent who, in short, has built his fortune on total melee (to steal and reset), outer midfield rotations, and development on the sidechains.
WITHOUT POSSESSION – Beyond the final figure (52% -48% for the Azzurri), Gattuso gave up possession in the offensive half, the dangerous one by raising the center of gravity, the one that enhances the skills of the Nerazzurri who once stole the ball in individual duels later. Open the front field to restart facing opponents. Of the 25’48 ” of real possession of Napoli, only 11 ‘were in the opposite field, always vertically and almost never betting and raising as a team. Other obvious data? Atalanta finally closed with 429 successful passes against 395 from Napoli and more possession in the opposite half of the field, where they already had the ball at their feet and found the defense deployed. What Gattuso wanted.
VERTICALITY – It is the basis of the transition to 4-2-3-1, with one less midfielder than the ‘4-3-3’ statement (or Sarriano, as you prefer) that provides for the slow ascent of the field and allows opponents replace. Against Atalanta, which exaggerates the pressure, leaving the three center-backs (sometimes even two) exposed, Napoli have totally given up on building the game. In this sense, Fabian’s performance was fantastic, who knew how to show his great vision of the game by repeatedly throwing Osimhen or Lozano to immediately create 4 against 4 in the other half with the three Nerazzurri centrals many times helped only by one of the players. . fifths on the weak side. Napoli-Atalanta closed with 11% of shots (against Genoa, for example, there was 5%).
TEAR FORWARD – Many will say that it is not a desired choice, Insigne or Elmas are missing who adapted on the left, but Gattuso in addition to Mertens launched the 3 forwards along with the greatest progression in the open field that he has available. If you have to attack the depth and imagine a race to find the 4 against 4 throwing your forwards even from behind the middle of the field, you can not do otherwise. And on the eve, many hypothesized / expected an adaptation of Fabian or Lobotka in a more advanced position to have a greater balance.
OFFENSIVE COURTS – Lozano, Osimhen and Politano, who is the 3 of the 4 attackers to launch, have never had a fixed position. Gattuso has thus transformed the strength of Atalanta (the robberies of the 3 centrals in advance) into a weak point. To get out of the man’s grip on the Nerazzurri central’s man, the forwards spread out across the entire opposing front and then from there, knowing they were following them, cut (from the center out and vice versa) putting the opponents in position . In the gaps created by one of the three, inevitably in a three-man defense, the other two companions entered. At one point, Gasperini’s defense, losing confidence, no longer tried to advance to maintain position, risking less but losing the key to his game.
NARROW SIDE – In the 4-2-3-1 the amplitude on the left came from the attackers, not from the side (as has happened for years with Mario Rui): hence the choice to confirm a defensive back like Hysaj. Compared to the usual even tighter because Atalanta makes a fortune with the offensive midfielders (in this case Ilicic) who retire due to the advance of the midfielder and then send in the ‘fifths’ as the third man between the central and the rival side. There was no room: both Hysaj and Di Lorenzo huddled in the center next to him and closed all the gaps, leaving the bottom line on the edge for some crosses, the lesser evil.
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