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When reading the reasons for “Yes” and “No” in the upcoming referendum on the reduction of parliamentarians, a critical and speculative intellect might remember Hegel’s warning that problems do not arise when one side is right and the other wrong, but when both are right. Because convincing arguments are distributed equally, so that almost all parts are divided within each other. In reality, this skein is even more tangled than it appears, and in at least three respects.
The first is what I would call the liar’s paradox. This is the famous antinomy attributed to Epimenides, who maintained that Cretans are always liars. And since he was also a Cretan, either he was telling the truth and then he was believing himself, or he was lying and therefore he was sometimes sincere. In the case at hand, the paradox consists of this: the initiative to reduce the number of deputies and senators arises from the anti-parliamentarianism of the Grill which, at least originally, saw in them a band of filibusters.
We all remember the avalanche of insults poured out on the representatives of the people, now branded as wandering zombies, now as rot destined to ignominious extinction.
In fact, in the visionary palinggenesis of the pentastelas, the legislative function would have been absorbed by that generic “general will” whose theorist, whom the French call with affectionate irony simply Jean-Jacques, had inspired the name of the grill platform.
Well now the situation has changed. In the masochistic enthusiasm to adhere to this cleansing indignation, all parties, with rare exceptions, have adapted to the five-star initiative. The most sensational case is that of the Democratic Party which, after having repeatedly voted against the reform, has changed its mind when calculating that the next Quirinal is worth a mass. But thus the ideological matrix of the reform itself turns into its opposite, because antiparliamentary hostility, right or wrong, has become parliamentary unanimity. So, amalgamated with that Parliament that they intended to overthrow, today the Grillini, like Epimenides the Cretan, refuse.
The second aspect, linked to the first, lies in the characteristic that almost every referendum has assumed since its implementation: that of putting the immediate political consequences of its result before the judgment on the merits of the disposition to be approved (or repealed). In 1974, on the issue of divorce, Fanfani’s extreme politicization transformed a legal-social debate into a crusade for or against Christian Democracy. Many liberals voted for the repeal of divorce so as not to let the communists win, and many communists, although convinced of the indissolubility of marriage, voted against it despite their historical opponent.
And in fact, the victory of the divorced produced, as a political consequence, a series of victories for the left that culminated in the conquest of the Municipality of Rome. The same happened four years ago with the referendum sought by Renzi, where many voters, although convinced of the benefits of the reform, voted against to get rid of the dynamic prime minister, who in fact lost his position.
Now, it is possible that, in these twenty days that remain, the same temptation will be repeated. Because if the “No” wins the biggest slap, the pentastellati will suffer, with serious risk to their survival, and especially to that of the government and perhaps the legislature.
And finally the legitimacy of the latter. If the “Yes” wins, we would have – partly here – a new Constitution, which would provide for a parliamentary composition completely different from the current one. Now, although a vacatio legis between the approval of the reform and its practical application is understandable, it is very difficult to argue that a Parliament can last two years or more with nine hundred members when the new Charter – and not an ordinary electoral law – – imposes a substantial reduction. Even if the contrary can be legally admitted, from the political point of view the situation would be presented with all its gravity.
I conclude. All this would not have happened if this reform had been planned, studied and implemented with the seriousness and competence imposed by the matter. Instead, the unforeseen race in the race for supposed emotional consensus has created an insoluble mess, where, however it turns out, Parliament itself will suffer unforeseen consequences, and perhaps its own dissolution.
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