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Two weeks after the election, Joe Biden has a nine-point lead over Donald Trump. In some groups of voters the margin in favor of Biden is greater: among the less young it is eleven points, in the female electorate it is twenty-three, a significant figure also given that the number of electricians is generally between three and four per cent. percent higher. that of the voters. But who continues to trust the polls? Especially for the United States where the vote of the large voters is crucial, not the popular. In 2016, Hillary Clinton was defeated despite getting almost three million more votes than Trump. Nor does it speak of the parliamentary representation system – with two senators per state – according to which Wyoming has the right to one senator for every two hundred and ninety thousand inhabitants, California to one for every twenty million. Untouchable constitutional balances.
Then there are the trends in the states, also in favor of Biden, ahead in Pennsylvania, Michigan, Wisconsin and Arizona, while the president and the challenger meet in Georgia and Florida, the latter perhaps decisive with its twenty-nine large voters. These are all states where Trump won four years ago, today we will see. The next two weeks promise to be full of emotions, not just for the United States.
On this side of the Atlantic, after the lashes distributed by Washington in the last four years, it is time to think about what to expect from the confirmation or change of tenant in the White House. Better to feel out an analysis coldly, instead of waving the fan banners. Better to admit as an assumption that Donald Trump, rather than the cause, was the symptom of a real malaise, generalized in large sectors of the population. This malaise has several reasons, already gutted, insecurity of the middle class, job insecurity, a feeling of marginalization, even unresolved identity issues. The answer was the cry and the mobilization for America first. Due to the role and authority of the United States in the world, the budget is quite modest, aside from the encouraging Abrahamic agreements, but that is not why the president is elected.
If the November 3 vote rewarded Joe Biden and a Democratic-voiced government team, the tone of the dialogue with Europe would certainly soften and some guidance from the Trump administration would be correct. A Democratic president, with long experience at the head of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, would review his predecessor’s options on climate change and the environment, readjusting US policy to already shared multilateral commitments. Furthermore, a rethinking of Trump’s decision to abandon the Iran nuclear deal is foreseeable. Biden would reestablish the synergy with the Europeans who together with Russia and China in 2015 brought the laborious negotiations with Tehran to fruition.
But in many other chapters of foreign policy, substantial continuity would prevail. We avoid possible illusions. It would not change America’s attention to the Pacific, nor the concerns and warnings towards China or the mistrust of Russia’s assertive nationalism or the expectation of greater engagement from European allies within NATO or even in the defense of American industry. through a trade policy sensitive to give and take. If Trump has rocked an overly laid-back Europe, addicted to the comfortable protection of his older brother abroad, Biden, albeit in more urban ways, would not deviate from that line.
Anyone who reaches the White House, through Europe, even if he seizes the pandemic, this would be the time to assume greater responsibility within and outside its borders, to “take control of its destiny” as Angela Merkel declared after the unfortunate debut. by Trump at the G7 in Taormina (2017). It hasn’t moved much since then. It took the tragedy of Covid, three years later, to give a blow to Europe towards greater cohesion and solidarity, for an unprecedented common commitment, for a new and perhaps promising consciousness. On the American side, however, it will now be in the preeminent interest of Europeans to invest new energy in the transatlantic relationship. For the culture and values that has been our field for seventy years, it must remain unreserved.
While waiting for the American vote, many in Europe hope, with more than justified reasons, that Trump’s term will end here. Furthermore, it is not easy to take sides with those who, among other things, expect the breakup of the EU, consider NATO obsolete and only tastefully cultivate frontal opposition. Of course, even those who think otherwise have every right to say so. It is important for governments to stay away from the microphones and spotlights and resist the temptation to go out onto the field in a game where they should be spectators, not players. If you have a preference, it is good that the ruler keeps it for you.
Four years ago, the Italian prime minister was too publicly enthusiastic about the candidate that he was later beaten and complicated the start of the dialogue with the winner. Republican or democrat, whoever takes office in the White House is in any case an essential reference for Italy and for Europe. Relations between states, especially if they are allies, work like this.
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