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But the words that Nadef describe the worst-case scenario seem, after a few days, very realistic. A panorama that Gualtieri always summarized on October 13 with “a very very strong increase” in infections “with very marked restrictions in Europe, which today is not the most likely scenario.” In the government document, the description reads: “We are witnessing a resurgence of Covid-19 infections in Italy, which would affect the months of October, November and December of the current year and the month of January 2021. Although not it translates into a second comprehensive block of non-essential activities, a marked increase in infections and hospital admissions would force the restriction of some forms of mobility and limit a series of activities. ”In this case, the GDP forecast for this year would drop to -10 , 5% and the recovery for the next one would stop at 1.8%. Therefore, the rebound would be postponed until 2022 (+ 6.5%). Figures in line with those of the Parliamentary Budget Office, for which, Depending on the weight of the second wave, GDP growth in 2020 would deteriorate between approximately one and two percentage points and would leave “a significant negative legacy (between approximately three and six percentage points) on the annual variation of GDP. in 2021 “.
Cesare Pozzi, professor of industrial economics at Luiss, how much would a new stop cost to Italy?
In a situation of such high uncertainty, the estimates are only intended to be disproved. Unfortunately we are in a her assc, a second blockade, as strong as the first, would be economically unsustainable. But the risk is that partial measures will cause infections to increase again, frighten people and the result is economically similar. The problem is that more than the cost of the interventions, we must think about the return that can be achieved when we emerge from the pandemic.
The services sector did not see the recovery of the summer that affected the manufacturing sector. Tourism, hotels and restaurants continue to count the damages. What activities would a closure in the winter months put at risk?
The rebound in manufacturing output that we have seen could be related to the replenishment of inventories. Our problem is how we enter the pandemic, the result of twenty years of lack of strategic options. We have progressively transformed into a country that sells for third parties, with rare exceptions. We are manufacturers of components, a situation in deep contradiction with the value proposition that we summarize as “Made in Italy”. We have lost the ability to do, to understand what the Italian product could be worth.
What specific risks does this carry?
Most of our companies are part of global value chains. If manufacturing were to stop, perhaps as other parts of the world progress, it would risk being replaced by other suppliers from other countries. The government must keep an important piece of our country standing, in the emergency, but at the same time put into play the entire industrial strategy with the aim of being strong again at the international level. It is not that we lack highly successful skills or activities, but today we do not have the ability to be the arbiter of our destiny. We need to rethink our country model to recover the excellence we have and make them stronger.
Coronavirus, Count in the Chamber: “Ready to intervene again if necessary”
How to do it in full emergency?
We entered the pandemic with a settlement pattern that disrupted our culture by urbanizing more and more people in Rome, Naples, Milan, and very few other metropolitan areas. Megacities are huge black holes: they attract people and generate very interesting consumer markets. But they end up destroying value if the systems of economic relations are changed without having a clear idea of the future of the country. A country with a tradition and a manufacturing vocation like ours has enormous potential, but it should be able to exploit its entire territory. We have a very varied skill system, but we haven’t had any strategy. The knots have reached a critical point.
But now let’s go back to the basic needs, like blocking layoffs. I would do it again?
It can be done, because our systems, in short, are based on mass production and consumption: without income protection, activities go into difficulties and a vicious cycle begins. But if you ask individual companies for a sacrifice, you also have to think about how to support them to manage the market changes that will occur. If before the pandemic we had 10% unemployment with an economy that the EU told us was close to its potential, it means that there is a structural problem. We must be clear that any emergency intervention must be defined consistently within a long-term strategic plan. We have to think about what will become of Italy in a year: pandemics are resolved, history teaches us, but we must ask ourselves in the end what will remain of them. Let’s stop the layoffs, but let’s see sector by sector if the companies we asked the considerable effort not to fire manage to return to the market. We focus on the emergency without framing it within a strategy, relying on hope and luck.
The Recovery Fund should finance new strategies, but with the new wave the priority is once again the defense of families, work and businesses …
Before this new emergency I only heard declarations of intent. I have some doubts that there is an organic strategy to change our system capable of dealing with the problems. The Recovery Fund itself translates into net benefits of around ten billion a year. How can a country change? A radical reform of general public spending, which represents a third of the economy, would have much more impact. We need to regain the ability to not only manufacture components of products and services designed by others, and to do so we must equip ourselves with an infrastructure system that is up to the new challenges.
Ten days to decide on the soft close. Conte and Speranza’s lines
Tommaso Ciriaco
The first wave generated an unprecedented response: 100 billion, from Cura Italia onwards. Debt will skyrocket to 160% of GDP. Is there scope to replicate such a response without jeopardizing the sustainability of public finances?
Our problem is general regulation. Italians have 1,600 billion deposited in the bank and total assets of 10,000 billion, four times the debt. “Savings are dormant in the bank coffers,” Keynes would say. A strong mobilization is needed. Unfortunately, the regulations take advantage of the role that banks can play in their channeling towards public debt, which, let’s not forget, represents an activity for those who buy it. Skills and resources are the two elements for development: Italy has a good level of knowledge and great savings. You must ground the first using the second as a tool. For this we need a transparent strategic public project. Again, to quote Keynes, at the end of the General Theory he explains how the expansion of the functions of government is the only feasible means of avoiding the complete destruction of existing economic forms and a condition for the satisfactory functioning of the individual initiative that it represents. the heart of the economy. our model of society.
