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The health emergency in Milan, the epicenter city of the second wave of Covid-19, is managed “on the sidelines.” In other words, the ATS has created a database with positive data, called Milan COR, which is indirectly accessible: incredibly, it is enough to know the tax code just to know if a citizen has contracted Covid-19. A decidedly sensitive data, perhaps the most sensitive at this stage, freely accessible to any curious. Especially since the tax code is certainly not confidential: it is inserted in any way and it is easy to calculate on the basis of personal data.
It all arises from the desire of ATS Milano to create a database of positives to be managed in a computerized way, a completely legitimate and indeed desirable aspiration, with the possibility for positive citizens to access and obtain more information on what to do, without weighing on human interventions and call centers.
Unfortunately, the procedure, which we think is effective from a functional point of view, is certainly not compatible with privacy legislation. In fact, although it does not give access to the medical history without full credentials, it makes clear who is positive (or was) and who is not. In fact, just enter the tax code in the corresponding fields. and any phone number to get the answer.
If the user is or was positive, the system “confesses” that the account is already registered and the system recommends access through traditional email credentials and password. But, being the database of positives, it is clear that the fact of “existing” corresponds to the fact of being present or having been positive in the past. Saying it clearly is at least inappropriate, to say the least.
As a counter-proof, we tested with the tax code of a buffered citizen and the result was negative: the account with that tax code in the database does not exist and the system in a very naive way says it clearly, revealing the only information that for a nosy mind.
It would have been better to record negative swabs as well, so the failure would only have let us know who the swab was taken from and not who tested positive. Instead, by doing so, you create a positive verification service open to any snoopers.
We’re not even in the field of computer carelessness here anymore, which creates even worse but more intricate problems. This is an obvious case of inability to understand the simplest implications of a procedure, a logical question even before a technique.
Let’s imagine that after our report (the appropriate information was also sent to ATS Milan), the system will be reviewed to ensure correct confidentiality. But history is, unfortunately, a litmus test, red, very red, of the attention and competence of those who are managing the health emergency in the area most affected by this Covid-19. Something that certainly does not reassure.
UPDATE (ore 12:15): the ATS Milano, we imagine after the publication of our article (at the same time as the publication, we notified the article to the communication office of ATS), has taken the site offline, probably waiting to correct the problem.
UPDATE (from 14:30): The Milano COR site is still unavailable, but the notice has been modified by removing the reference to the email address of the ATS Milano IT structure, evidently robbed at this time,
UPDATE (from 18:00): The Milano COR site was reactivated, but only with the standard login key and without the SMS registration feature, which allowed it to discover Covid-19 positivity based on the tax code. The service is then reactivated for already registered users, while at the moment it is not clear how new users are registered.
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