[ad_1]
Released today after an 18-month investigation, the final report from the US Congress points to Boeing’s grave responsibility for the incidents of Lion Air Flight 610 (October 29, 2018) and Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 (March 10, 2019) in which 189 and 157 people lost their lives. On December 17, 2019, Boeing announced the suspension of production of all variants of the 737 Max starting in January 2020. Only then to make known the desire to resume it and reach 31 copies per month by 2021.
The Boeing 737 MAXs ran on 1996 hardware, which was already less powerful than a console.
Now, a detailed analysis of the 238-page House Transportation Committee with dozens of interrogations, interviews and more than 600,000 pages of documents, nails Boeing and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).
The two incidents in less than five months “were the horrifying culmination of a series of flawed technical assumptions by Boeing engineers, a lack of transparency by Boeing management and grossly insufficient oversight by the FAA.” Boeing also reduced testing and shortened pilot training in an effort to catch up with the Airbus A320neo.
The facts in this report document a disturbing pattern of technical miscalculations and horrible management mistakes by Boeing. It also sheds light on numerous oversight failures and loopholes by the FAA that played a significant role in the 737 Max crashes.
Report anticipations
That there was a flaw in the Max’s anti-lock automatic flight control system, the pilots who had tested it knew. “An airplane designed by a clown,” they said. In June 2016, one of the employees was concerned that MCAS (Maneuvering characteristics increase system) it could thwart pilot commands during a test flight and faulty sensor data could cause system problems. However, according to the report, the employee’s colleagues “belittled” the concerns. But problems with the connection between the sensors and MCAS were identified as a major factor in the two incidents. The Federal Aviation Administration wanted to continue. Counted benefits. Pilots’ messages or comments that came out of months of research they do not “reveal any safety hazards that have not been identified as part of the proposed ongoing modification verification activities for the aircraft.” DeFazio he had said that the words painted a “haunting picture” of history.
The confessions recorded
The principal engineer on the Boeing 737 Max jet project confirmed that he had approved a critical design change in the aircraft’s software and was unaware of key details about how it worked or that there was a warning from a pilot test that if the system was not working properly the results could be “catastrophic”. It means deadly. The plane crashed in response to a wrong impulse created by the software. The acknowledgment of the engineer is one of several revelations contained in the report released by investigators from the House Transportation Committee. The document describes a large number of oversight gaps that allowed federal regulators to certify that the plane was safe despite the fact that Boeing and FAA officials weren’t fully aware of the project.
Employees under stress
According to the report, Boeing employees were under pressure. They had to sell the new planes quickly without requiring their pilots to undergo a more extensive remodel. The goal was symbolized by the “countdown clocks” hung on the wall of a conference room. The report describes Boeing officials as “extraordinarily reluctant to acknowledge any missteps or mistakes.”
Boeing, CEO overthrown after tragedies a check for 62 million dollars
Testing for faulty software
Tests showed that it took more than 10 seconds for a pilot to realize what was happening and then follow the correct procedures to neutralize the command that sent the plane into a dive, with catastrophic consequences. But even this element was hidden from the supervisory authorities. In addition, an alarm that should have signaled the incorrect detection of the sensor that caused the activation of the anti-lock system was found out of service in a large part of the 737 max fleet, an element that was never communicated to pilots and companies. At the time of the accident in Ethiopia, 350 737 Max aircraft had been delivered.
Boeing expects three years of black market. New cuts to the plane giant
“Accidents could have been prevented”
The investigators said Boeing had “multiple opportunities” to shift the “Max design and development trajectory to a safer course.” Missed opportunities, the report concludes. The two incidents are “clear evidence that the current regulatory system is fundamentally flawed and needs to be fixed.”
Boeing, the 737 Max curse continues: since January production stop, no layoffs
Max ready to go
The 737 Max is still on the ground, but is expected to be cleared to fly again in the next few months, following a review of the MCAS software. International regulators began meeting at London Gatwick Airport on Monday to review training requirements for Max pilots. Michael Stumo, whose daughter Samya died in the second accident, said the report showed that Max’s recertification should stop. “The FAA and Boeing withheld the information before and are doing it again,” Stumo said in a statement, saying the families of the victims have not yet obtained the technical data on the aircraft repairs that must be accessed. guaranteed by the Freedom of Information Law.
