Brexit or the damage of nationalist populism



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In the long months of the most acute phase of Covid-19 and the blockades that paralyzed economic activities and complicated contacts and negotiations, the European Union had to focus on priorities very different from Brexit: defining common lines to limit contagion, putting joint research programs on therapies and vaccines are underway and, above all, take common measures capable of counteracting the most immediate effects of the pandemic on the economy and, subsequently, decide on a common aid program necessary to stimulate recovery and reconstruction (Next Generation EU).

The monitoring of Brexit and the fate of the negotiations to define future relations between the EU and the United Kingdom had disappeared from the agendas of the European institutions. We did not learn about Brexit and relations with London for many months, also because, in fact, the negotiations, interrupted in the most serious phase of the pandemic, then continued at a reduced pace and under the radar.

British Prime Minister Boris Johnson has thought in recent days to bring the issue back to the fore in the news and in politics, with a double maneuver that surprised and displaced the European counterpart. He first issued another ultimatum to European negotiators indicating the date of October 15 as the last deadline to reach an agreement on the future of post-Brexit bilateral relations.

And as if the threat of a new ultimatum was not enough, a few days later his government presented in Parliament a bill (the Internal Market Bill) that contains, among others, some provisions explicitly intended to question – or rather allow violating – so many provisions of the Protocol on Northern Ireland, which is an integral part of the withdrawal agreement, solemnly signed by the British government itself and ratified by the Parliament of London.

Negotiations on the future of bilateral relations were already proceeding with difficulty and with many difficulties. As far as is known, the most controversial points remain a matter of concern, in particular the future fishing regime in British waters and the state aid scheme.

On fishing, the EU calls for the recognition of historic fishing rights for European fishermen. London is adamant on the idea of ​​a regime that allows the British government to grant fishing rights to European fishermen at their discretion, year after year.

And in state aid, while the EU asks to assimilate the regulations in force in the United Kingdom to the European, with the aim of defining (as a counterpart to access to the European market for British goods and services) equal conditions, which allows to avoid the hypothesis of unfair competition, London does not intend to enter into commitments on the matter and seeks to maintain maximum freedom of action.

Two certainly complex issues (state aid plus fishing) but probably solvable, with a minimum of good will on both sides.

But the negotiating framework and perspectives on the future of bilateral relations have now changed and appear to be seriously compromised with the introduction of the Internal Market Act and the declared intention of the Johnson government to challenge or violate crucial provisions of the law. . withdrawal agreement. An international agreement, which, it is worth remembering, had been negotiated for a long time and then signed by the British and ratified by the London Parliament, then perfected in all respects and fully in force, the violation of which would imply a very serious vulnus of fundamental principles . of international law.

In London, the unexpected and surprising initiative of the Johnson executive is arousing the concerns and protests of those who see dramatically compromised the credibility and reliability of a government, which has no qualms about questioning the contents of an international agreement. to the point that even leading exponents of the Premier Party have expressed explicit reservations about the government’s initiative.

For its part, the EU could not fail to react. And so did the Commission at the highest level, threatening not only the suspension of the ongoing negotiations, but also the adoption of sanctions against London and the referral of the United Kingdom to the Court of Justice, for a sensational and fragrant violation of a commitment solemnly sanctioned in an international agreement that is incorporated into European law.

It is currently difficult to predict how the story will unfold. It is possible that we are in the presence of another “bluff” from Johnson, who would have chosen to dramatize the confrontation with the EU in part to regain consensus (also in decline as a result of the controversial management of Covid) in his electorate in a more radical way. anti-European, and partly to up the ante in a very complex and difficult negotiation with the EU.

It is also possible, but less likely given the prevailing tendencies in the Conservative Party, that the Westminster examination of the controversial bill will remove those provisions that constitute a clear violation of the withdrawal agreement, thus allowing dialogue and negotiations to be resumed. with Brussels.

However, the fact is that today, as a consequence of Johnson’s dual initiative, the path to an agreement with the EU is increasingly complicated and increasingly uphill. While the “hard Brexit” scenario, of a UK exit from the EU without a deal, looks much more likely today than it did a few weeks ago. And this despite the evidence, underlined by dozens of authoritative reports and analyzes from a wide variety of sources, that a no-deal Brexit would proportionally harm the UK far more than the EU.

If this is the result, it only remains to conclude that, in the perception of the capricious and unpredictable British Prime Minister, satisfying the requests, motivated mainly by ideological considerations, for a visible and illusory recovery of national sovereignty counts more than protecting the evidence and interests. well-demonstrated national economics.

One more demonstration, as if it were necessary, of the damage that nationalist populism can cause in the face of government responsibilities.

(This post has already appeared in International Affairs)



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