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Shalini Chawla
Distinguished member of the Center for Air Energy Studies
While the world is engrossed in its fight against the global pandemic, Pakistan’s strategic assets find this period to be the optimal time to step up its covert war strategy of “bleeding India.” On May 3, in an overnight operation in Handwara in Jammu and Kashmir, the Indian security establishment lost five people fighting against Pakistan-sponsored terrorists. One of the two terrorists killed in the operation is identified as one of the main commanders of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Haider, a Pakistani citizen. Reportedly, 25-30 terrorists crossed the LoC and infiltrated the Valley in April.
Pakistan-based terror groups have been upping their ante, and in October last year, an unknown organization in Kashmir, The Resistance Front (TRF), reportedly a Pak-sponsored LeT front, made its debut in the competitive world of terrorism, and carried out a grenade attack on a street market in the city of Srinagar, injuring some vendors. TRF has an active online presence and has carried out a series of attacks against Indian forces. Pakistan has been on the gray list of the International Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and under international pressure to act and curb terrorist financing channels. Therefore, Islamabad strongly felt the need for a new brand in the name of resistance and human rights to carry out and intensify sub-conventional warfare in the Valley.
The terrorist attack is painful and frustrating, but not surprising, given Pakistan’s long commitment to sub-conventional warfare and critical events in the recent past. Pakistan has been exasperated after the revocation of Article 370 in the Valley. Pakistan’s long-awaited anguish, reflected in its series of hate tweets, intense propaganda against the Modi government, claiming that it is a government led by Nazi ideology and intensified diplomatic offensive, highlighting the Kashmir issue in all possible international forums.
Imran Khan, who is in sync with the deep state’s strategic goals and owes his victory in the 2018 election to the army chief, General Bajwa, has been highlighting the alleged Islamophobia, beginning in his speech at the UN General Assembly in September 2019, in an aggressive attempt to unite the Muslim states against India (for Kashmir). Pakistan’s all-weather ally, China, has been a supporter of Pakistan’s position on Kashmir, and Beijing has made it easier to raise the Kashmir issue at the United Nations Security Council multiple times. The threat of nuclear war has also been repeatedly highlighted by Pakistan to draw much-desired international attention to Kashmir in the past year.
Pakistan’s efforts to intensify militancy in the Valley at this time are mainly due to four factors: n The conventional offensive is currently not feasible for Pakistan due to its increasing economic stress and now the added stress of the Covid crisis; n The agreement between the United States and the Taliban signed on February 29 has increased Pakistan’s faith in the covert war strategy it carried out against Afghanistan. Pakistan has been recognized by Washington as a facilitator of the deal, and the Pakistani military is appreciating diplomatic dividends, as well as the Pentagon’s moderately altered stance toward Pakistan; n The Afghan Taliban, an ally of Pakistan, have gained legitimacy and strength in Kabul. This conveniently satisfies Pakistan’s desire to gain strategic depth and seek control over Kabul, which would facilitate its designs against New Delhi; and n Pakistan obtained a four-month delay for meeting the FATF deadline to stop financing terrorist groups. Islamabad feels that it has the time and the space to carry out a militancy against India without the pressure of being questioned in the FATF (at least not too soon!). Traditionally, Pakistan has followed a three-dimensional strategy against India:
Conventional level: Pakistan has tried to achieve parity with India in terms of its military construction. The military leadership in Pakistan has focused primarily on defense construction and modernization, highlighting strategic threats in the region.
Sub-conventional level: Pakistan opted for the covert war option in 1947, when it launched its first attack in the name of tribal revolt. The Pakistani military has persistently pursued a covert war strategy for the past seven decades, although its tactics have been modified and evolved. The three wars started by Pakistan have started covertly.
Nuclear level: Nuclear weapons are perceived as an infallible guarantee of their sovereignty and survival against India. After the acquisition of nuclear weapons (in 1987), Pakistan is more confident in its “offensive defense” strategy. Pakistani leaders have used nuclear weapons as an umbrella to pursue terrorism as a foreign policy tool. Belief in nuclear weapons has grown with the adoption of the “first use” doctrine and the projection of a low nuclear threshold. Balakot’s attacks challenged Islamabad’s nuclear posture to some degree.
It is pertinent to ask how this strategy will evolve towards India in the coming times. The Pakistani military has relied more on the sub-conventional or covert war dimension of its strategy and will continue to firmly rely on it.
A fourth dimension of cyber warfare and propaganda is now strengthening and intensifying.
Cyber warfare and propaganda: Pakistan has stepped up the propaganda war, which is a low-cost option and considered a powerful weapon in shaping its anti-India narrative. Perception management has remained an integral part of the military strategy not only against India and Afghanistan, but also within the state towards its own people to gain support and legitimacy for the army’s overwhelming stature and unreasonable actions. While Imran Khan used social media for his anti-Modi agenda after the Balakot attacks and after the Article 370 revocation, official reports suggest that 7,000 social media accounts are being operated from Pakistan for a campaign aimed at influence New Delhi’s relations with the Gulf countries.
While Islamabad’s denial of its role in the power war is expected, its revised strategy against India aims to step up militancy in the Valley, under a new brand, and launch an aggressive cyber warfare to step up propaganda and highlight the Islamophobia.
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