The temporary truce that India and China appear to have achieved after a meeting of foreign ministers – S Jaishankar and Wang Yi – in Moscow last week does not guarantee that no conflict will break out. The potential for a crash remains strong, says Srikanth Kondapalli, professor of China studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University. India, which stayed on the border for four months in the face of China’s much-acclaimed military and economic power, has shown that the argument of asymmetry of power no longer holds, it adds. Edited excerpts from an interview:
The meeting between the Indian Foreign Minister S Jaishankar and his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi produced the first joint statement between India and China since the start of this crisis in May. How do you see this development? Is this the beginning of a process that leads to a thaw, perhaps?
The points mentioned in the joint statement are bland, but welcome as they ease tensions. There was no real expectation of an outcome from the Jaishankar-Wang Yi talks; the result was a surprise. It’s unclear what tipped the balance in terms of a joint statement. We have seen an armed stalemate for four months, with ties between India and China on the edge. We have seen images of rocket launchers, tanks in China, all ready to unleash their power against India, they showed militarism. The Chinese have also made many diplomatic statements that can be described as coercive. These come from his foreign ministry, his defense ministry, his Western Theater Command, from the publisher of Global times, Hu Xijin. The various Chinese statements have seemed interventionist, prescriptive and coercive. Now, the Chinese side seems to have come down and changed course suddenly. What I see is a temporary peace.
What do you think prompted this change from the Chinese side?
It could be the intervention of (Russian President Vladimir) Putin. In the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Russia and China have the same position. The Chinese cannot say no to Russia because they rely heavily on Moscow for policy and coordination in relation to the US, the EU and the Indo-Pacific. The (Chinese) decline could also be due to the start of winter. Temperatures in Ladakh at those heights can reach minus 40 ° C and that is not conducive to human security, forget about preparing for a war. We have had a stalemate in Ladakh for four months and these were the summer months. If you don’t have a result for your mobilization in summer, how can you expect it in winter? The question of success or failure comes with a big question mark in the mountainous terrain. India has a competitive advantage in mountain warfare – you saw what happened in the Galwan Valley (June 15, 2020). India presented itself as a formidable adversary. The Indian mobilization has been effective. It was reflected in the visits of Prime Minister Narendra Modi and others to Ladakh; the defense minister (Rajnath Singh) was there and the Indian army chief (Manoj Mukund Naravane) was there. On the Chinese side, we only know of a visit by the Chinese Foreign Minister (Wang Yi) to Tibet. At least, that’s the only one that was made public. On the Indian side, the military was given freedom, reinforcing its effectiveness, unlike previous governments, which intervened in military operations. This has emboldened the armed forces: there is no pressure on the military. There is coordination at various levels. All of which has helped the Indian army put up a strong resistance. Yet another reason for China to change its mind could be its ongoing disputes in the South China Sea, the East China Sea (with Japan over the Senkaku Islands), its battles with the United States and Australia (on the diplomatic, trade and trade fronts). others). If they face setbacks on the Indian front, then it will have a cascading effect on the Taiwan Strait, as well as the South China Sea, the East China Sea, and all the other fronts I just mentioned.
Did India’s use of the Special Border Force with recruits from the Tibetan community in India have anything to do with the Chinese changing their minds? Does it also indicate a change in Tibetan politics from India?
India, which has taken dominant positions at the top of the five characteristics south of Pangong Tso, I think may have contributed to China changing its position. I say that because the adoption of dominant positions by India in these respects tipped the balance in favor of India. The operations to ensure the heights in these characteristics were carried out by the Special Border Force (SFF). Taking these heights could lead to the interception of Chinese forces, giving India a tactical advantage. Indian forces can intercept Chinese convoys moving from Chushul to Demchok through the valleys below. That is a clear disadvantage for China. So in that sense, yes, the SFF deployment may have had a role to play. Has India changed its strategy in Tibet? I don’t think we can say that. SFF operations so far have been on the Indian side of the line of royal control (LAC). We do not know if they were employed outside the Indian territory in Tibet. We know that the SFF played a role in the 1971 India-Pakistan war and then again in the Kargil war in 1999. This is the first time that we have seen them deployed on this scale in a situation with China.
India and China have had so many agreements in the past that they have not worked. What makes you think that Friday’s joint statement will work even to bring temporary peace?
There is no guarantee that this will work. This can also be ruled out. It all depends on the reality of the terrain. A skirmish is still possible. A temporary peace was made in Moscow with the possible intervention of Russia. The only guarantee of permanent peace is a border settlement, for which we have no solution. I say temporary peace because winter is coming and that, as I said before, is a limiting factor. There will not be a complete pushback. Indian troops will be present in Ladakh even if there is a pushback.
So what you are saying is that we will have a situation similar to Siachen, where the presence of troops will be maintained throughout the year, in Ladakh with respect to China as well?
Yes. There will be soldiers occupying heights and other areas. Or the technology will be used for surveillance. Either way, the dynamics of LAC management will undergo a change. There will be further militarization of LAC at least in Ladakh, which has become the eye of the storm.
In the face of all this, what future do you see for relations between India and China? The events of this summer seem to have reset all the equations.
Foreign Minister Jaishankar has said that unless there is a withdrawal of troops, India will not develop bilateral relations. China’s position is, let’s focus on the development partnership: investments in infrastructure and other areas. Clearly, there is a space between the two sides. India’s position is that Chinese troops should withdraw to the April 2020 positions. I think that is unlikely to happen. Therefore, we are likely to see a relationship between India and China that is antagonistic, difficult and complicated. The Chinese are not likely to abandon the lands they have occupied and will not descend from that position. So what I see is that there will be pictures at BRICS meetings (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and SCO meetings, but India-China summits like the ones we saw in Wuhan (in 2018) and Chennai ( 2019) are unlikely if there is no commitment.
One thing I would like to add here is that what this tension on the India-China border has demonstrated is that the “power asymmetry” argument does not hold up now. There was the argument that India is a $ 2 trillion economy and China is five times that meant China had a huge advantage. They have a much stronger military force, a much larger economy, greater military spending, etc., so India is no match for China; that myth has been destroyed. Concerted action by India has yielded results.
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