At a time when China’s Foreign Ministry is expressing its hopes that troops will return to camp areas after the current confrontation in Ladakh, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) shows no such signs on the ground and has undertaken the increase in strength in the disputed Pangong fourth finger relief function. Tso.
The doubling of the strength of PLA troops on finger four on the north shore of the lake has sown mistrust in the minds of the Indian army about the sincerity of Beijing’s offer, even as it occupies dominant positions south of the saltwater lake. . The only other explanation is that the Chinese Foreign Ministry is not on the same page as the PLA Western Theater Commander.
Foreign Minister S Jaishankar will meet with his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi in Moscow on Thursday to discuss the border situation and remind Beijing of the bilateral commitment to the peace and tranquility agreements signed since 1993 that refer to the minimum deployment of troops along the Royal Line of Control (LAC). ).
The fundamental problem facing the Indian army in the withdrawal and de-escalation proposal is the lack of Chinese guarantees that the PLA will not occupy the positions left by Indian troops south of Pangong Tso. Just as the PLA has taken dominant positions up to finger 4 on the north bank, the Indian Army now maintains the Rezang La-Rechin La ridgeline right up to its perception of the LAC. PLA troops are practically contesting these Indian positions through large-scale deployments south of the lake.
Although the Chinese spokesman spoke on Tuesday about the harsh weather conditions in the area, the fact is that the Indian army has become used to such conditions since Operation Maghdoot in Siachen in 1984. “The Indian soldier is prepared for the mountain and the snow. from the beginning with practically all of them serve in the Line of Control with Pakistan, the Siachen Glacier or LAC ”, said a military commander. The PLA, on the other hand, last bled in Vietnam in 1979.
The basic problem facing the disengagement is that the Chinese have road infrastructure to LAC in Ladakh, while Indian army troops have to traverse mountain passes, nullahs, and ridges to reach their current posts and positions. “If China is serious about disengagement and de-escalation, then both sides must bilaterally commit that the other side will not occupy the heights once the current occupant has cleared them. Only then will the disconnection be successful, ”said a military commander.
However, in the last 27 years, the PLA has nibbled on the LAC with Indian Army troops with its defensive mentality glued only to patrol points (defined by the China Study Group), which are far below the Indian perception line.
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