China’s movements in Ladakh and the South China Sea are based on a historical construction. If a Green Line drawn up in 1960 by then-Supreme Leader Mao Zedong is the target of the People’s Liberation Army in Ladakh, it is dashed line 9, 10, or 11 (depending on political expediency; the concept has a dubious historical basis in Chinese-French language). war) which is the objective of the Red Army in the South China Sea.
The PLA’s main enemy in the South China Sea is a competing superpower, the United States, which backs Taiwan, even as ASEAN members look the other way. His adversary in Ladakh, alongside sensitive and restless Tibet and Xinjiang, is a rising power, India, whose neighbors have grown increasingly comfortable with Beijing in recent years.
Although the ambitious PLA western theater commander Zhao Zongqi portrayed the Indian army as an aggressor or warmonger after Monday’s clash in the Rezang La – Rechin La mountain range, the fact remains that Indian troops only prevent the Chinese from Reach your outrageous Green. Line claim in southern Pangong Tso. The Indian army did the same from August 29-30, and in the same place. It is quite evident that there is a short-term and long-term context to the latest confrontation, both of which are familiar to commanders on the ground.
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Clearly, the latest PLA aggression is aimed at teaching the Indian army a lesson in the use of the Special Border Force, made up largely of Tibetans in exile, on the front lines in the August showdown. What has bothered Beijing the most is that the sacrifice of a Tibetan SFF JCO Nyima Tenzin in the August 29-30 battle, something that has become a rallying point for Tibetans around the world and has given a new life to the resistance against the Chinese. occupation of the region. To make matters worse, the SFF proved its worth in high mountainous terrain.
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However, China’s long-term goal is to destabilize India by exerting continuous pressure along the 3488 km Royal Line of Control (LAC), fully understanding its impact on Indian politics and on the image of Prime Minister Narendra Modi. . On August 12, 2013, Shyam Saran, an expert on China and then chairman of the National Security Advisory Board, had submitted a report to the then Prime Minister’s Office advocating for increased patrolling of LAC by the Indian military and the Indo-Tibetan border. Saran said that while the patrol points (65 in Ladakh) within the Indian LAC were identified by China’s main study group, there was a need for the Indian Army and ITBP to patrol up to the actual LAC as there were gaps significant between the points and the perceived line. While admitting that it was difficult to patrol the mountainous terrain, the former foreign secretary noted an increase in PLA activity in these areas due to the improvement of border infrastructure by China.
Essentially, what Saran in the context of the April-May 2013 PLA intrusion into the Depsang Bulge meant that the PLA had the option to nibble on the LAC due to the lack of Indian patrol up to the perceived LAC. The 2013 intrusion has ensured that Indian forces are practically unable to patrol points 10-13 with the PLA sitting at the mouth of the Bulge in Raki Nullah. The PLA’s aggression in the past four months in East Ladakh has left Narendra Modi’s government no choice but to militarily dispute the PLA’s bite of LAC or lose political equity by cending territory to communist China.
India faces a triple blow from China. First, its economy has contracted 23 percent in the first quarter due to the coronavirus pandemic that originated in Wuhan, China. Second, the economic cost of putting the Indian Army, Navy and Air Force on war alert with emergency purchases is significant and increasing every day. It is quite evident that the Chinese economy can afford this deployment, and Beijing would like to tire the Indian military and bleed India economically until the status quo ante is restored in Ladakh. The PLA has been an expert in tiring the enemy since the Korean War. Third, the country that is using its all-weather ally Pakistan to provoke India at the Line of Control (LOC) through cross-border shooting and terrorist infiltration. Had it not been for the umbilical ties between India and the Nepalese army, Beijing might well have succeeded in activating the fourth dimension to bleed India out.
While the PLA’s attention is diverted today on two fronts with the United States activating the Indochina front, with Australia and Japan, India will feel more military pressure in Ladakh if it changes the position of the United States after the country’s presidential elections in November. Europe has yet to understand the rise of China, which has close economic ties to the EU powerhouse Germany. The overall outlook for India appears to be grim at the moment in the context of China, but the country will be in pole position if it can get past this round of Chinese ladies.
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