September 20, 2020 4:10:54 am
The PPs are meant to be reached to demonstrate that the area between these points and LAC is accessible. (Proceedings)
Defense Minister Rajnath Singh, making a statement at Rajya Sabha on Thursday On the situation along the Royal Line of Control in Ladakh, he said that “the patrol patterns are traditional and well defined … no force on the ground can stop our soldiers from patrolling” and “there will be no change in the patrol pattern. “
But the situation on the ground, especially in the Depsang Plains in the far north of Ladakh, is very different. Because more than a month before the clash began in May on the north shore of Pangong Tso, where Indian soldiers are not allowed to move from finger 4 to point LAC on finger 8, Chinese troops cut off access from the Indians to five “traditional” patrol points (PP) on the Depsang Plains.
Confirming this, a leading government source told The Sunday Express earlier this week that the Chinese blocked access to PP 10, 11, 11A, 12 and 13 in March-April this year.
Located east of the North Sub-Sector Strategic Highway or the Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldie Highway (DSDBO), the five PPs are close to LAC, but not in LAC itself; in short, they are located well within the line. that marks the Indian territory. While the government source downplayed the extent of the area where access to Indian troops is denied, estimating it to be around 50 square kilometers or more, a former member of the China Study Group, the government’s main advisory body that it also decides the location of these patrol points, said that “it is a material change” due to the “tactical and strategic importance” of the area.
The PPs are located east of Bottleneck, a rocky outcrop that provides connectivity across the Depsang Plains. It is about 7 km east of Burtse, which is on the DSDBO road and has an Indian army base.
The track going east from Burtse forks in two at Bottleneck, which is why it is also called the Y-Junction. The north track, following the Raki Nala, goes towards PP10, while the southeast track goes towards PP-13 via Jivan Nala. On the patrol route moving south, on a rough crescent from PP10 to PP 13, are PP 11, 11A and 12.
Not having access to these PPs means that Chinese soldiers are preventing indigenous peoples from reaching and asserting control over an area that India claims is on their side of LAC.
By definition, LAC is the line that defines the territory under the control of India. The PPs are meant to be reached to demonstrate that the area between these points and LAC is accessible.
To block Indian troops at Bottleneck and deny them access to traditional patrol routes, the PLA would have crossed not only LAC, but even the PP.
According to the government source, the Chinese soldiers have not “settled” in the PP, but come and block Indian troops when they go there. The source said that Indian troops, if they wish, can still reach the patrol points, but that will mean creating another “flash point.”
But a former army commander, who served in the sector, said it is not possible for the Chinese
blockade Indian troops at Bottleneck unless they have barricaded themselves near the Y-junction with a sustained surveillance system in place.
In Army parlance, the patrol points within LAC, and the traditional routes that link them, are known as “patrol boundaries.” The five patrol points and the patrol lines that join them form the “patrol boundaries” in Depsang. Some Army officials also refer to these as the “LAC within the LAC”.
The former commander said that the patrol limit is considered the actual LAC since the troops “do not have a mandate” to go beyond these points.
But according to those who are familiar with India-China issues and know the PP and how and why they were established within LAC, they are not intended to be “patrol boundaries”, but rather “patrol lines.” Depending on the terrain, there could be several patrol routes between the same points, to be decided by the commanders on the ground.
The PP were established in the 1970s by the China Study Group, formed in 1975, made up of senior officials from the ministries of the Interior, Defense, Foreign Affairs, and intelligence agencies in consultation with the military and the ITBP. The patrol points started in the 1970s before India officially accepted the LAC in 1993.
Former national security adviser Shivshankar Menon, in his book Choices: Inside the Making of India’s Foreign Policy, recalled: “In 1976, based on the best available border information for India, the Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs established the Study Group reporting to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to recommend revised patrol limits, rules of engagement and the pattern of Indian presence along the border with China. He noted: “Throughout this period, each side slowly moved towards the line, asserting its presence through periodic patrols in an intricate pattern that intersected in areas where both states had different interpretations of where LAC was.”
With the limited infrastructure at that time, the rationale for the patrol points was to make optimal use of men and equipment, as it was impossible to deploy soldiers in every inch of LAC’s 3,488 km.
As the infrastructure gradually improved, the patrol points were revised from time to time, to the benefit of India. In most places, SPs are now located in or very close to LAC. Depsang is one of those areas where PPs are doing well within LAC.
Also in Depsang, a former official said, the PPs have been revised multiple times since the 1970s, each time moving toward LAC.
Regarding the area between LoP (boundaries / lines of patrol) and LAC, former officials said it was not supposed to have been abandoned. Rather, the idea behind infrastructure development in these areas was to increase patrolling and extend it further into LAC.
Earlier this week, the government source said that India has not had access to areas beyond the LoP for “more than 10 to 15 years.” She said that a total area of 972 square kilometers was now outside the Indian port. But others suggest that India has not entered the area long before, as troops have remained on the routes between patrol points.
Former army commanders suggested that these patrol points were a more realistic assessment of the areas to which India could assert control.
Control over the Depsang Plains is vital to Ladakh’s defense as it runs on both sides of the recently completed DSDBO highway, an all-weather supply line from Leh to the final SSN outpost at Daulat Beg Oldie, located near the base of the Karakoram Pass that separates China. Ladakh Xinjiang Autonomous Region.
The presence of Chinese soldiers on the Indian side of LAC could pose a threat to the DSDBO highway and areas to the west. On their LAC side, the Chinese have built the G219 highway from Tibet to Xinjiang, both troubled provinces, via Aksai Chin. They see India’s DSDBO highway and the Daulat Beg Oldie airstrip reactivation as direct threats to G219.
The Depsang Plains are relatively flat and provide one of the few launch pads for a military offensive in Ladakh. The PLA, according to the government source, has stationed two brigades on its LAC side in this region. India has also stationed “more than a brigade” in the area.
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