Precisely six years ago, on September 17, 2014, Ahmedabad and New Delhi were abuzz with the visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping and his wife, the folk singer Peng Liyuan. Television channels played an extended video loop of Prime Minister Narendra Modi sitting on a swing with Xi on the banks of the Sabarmati River, as excited presenters predicted an era of Sino-Indian peace, forged between the two strongmen who had reached the power in two years from each other.
Six years later, the Modi-Xi relationship is in tatters, as are the ties between New Delhi and Beijing. With Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers marching through the Royal Line of Control (LAC) in May and occupying territory that the Indian army has traditionally controlled and patrolled, many Indians now see Xi and China not only as adversaries, but as implacable enemies.
For the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the fact that Modi did not befriend Xi or did not achieve the holy grail of a border agreement constitutes a huge political embarrassment. There has been no movement on a border agreement since 2005, when China agreed to sign a set of “political parameters” that would govern the final solution. Now the opposition paints Modi as a confident simpleton who has been duped by the canny Chinese leader.
The optimism surrounding Xi’s visit was, in fact, clearly misplaced. Even as Modi served tea for Xi in Ahmedabad, Beijing was putting the Indian prime minister to the test by sending 1,000 soldiers through LAC in Chumar, in southern Ladakh.
According to the Indian Foreign Ministry, Modi sternly told Xi that such incidents would inevitably affect the broader relationship. With the PLA’s withdrawal from Chumar, the Indian prime minister continued to believe that his parity with Xi could result in the resolution of the Sino-Indian discord.
In May 2015, during his three-day visit to China, Modi pressed Xi again on the border issue when they met in Xi’an. Officials familiar with the conversation say Xi did not even respond. Instead, in Beijing the next day, Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang gave Modi a lecture with Beijing’s repetitive formulation that the border issue was a “complex issue left from history” and that solving it required “patience. “.
During 2015 and 2016, Modi was concerned about his growing acceptance of the United States. In January 2015, President Barack Obama and Modi signed a “Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean region.” Taking the US-India partnership beyond the 2014 Vision Statement and the 2015 Declaration of Friendship, Modi and Obama “resolved that the United States and India should be considered priority partners in the Asia-Pacific region and the Indian Ocean “.
Meanwhile, Defense Ministers Manohar Parrikar and his US counterpart Ashton Carter launched a US-India Maritime Security Dialogue and signed the Defense Trade and Technology Agreement (DTTI) and a Memorandum Logistics Exchange Agreement (LEMOA) and communications compatibility long overdue. And Security Agreement (COMCASA). Washington also designated India as a major defense partner, opening doors to sell high-tech military equipment in India.
Washington also strongly supported New Delhi’s entry into the four global non-proliferation agreements: the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group, the Wassenaar Agreement and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).
An angry Beijing pointed out his displeasure. China blocked India’s candidacy for NSG membership and placed a “technical suspension” on the appointment of Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Mohammed leader Masood Azhar as a global terrorist at the United Nations. The distancing gained momentum with New Delhi’s refusal in 2017 to participate in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China’s flagship infrastructure construction project.
The underground fight between Modi and Xi came to a head in Doklam in 2017, when Indian troops intervened in disputed territory between China and Bhutan to block road construction in China for 73 tense days. China’s exceptionally aggressive message during the crisis suggests that Xi himself assumed control of events at some stage in the confrontation. A mutual pushback was negotiated, but China ultimately got its way by re-entering the disputed Doklam bowl later, which India did not contest.
“That was a clear message from China’s top leader,” says a now-retired senior official who served in the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO). “Xi was telling Modi that China cannot be prevented from taking what we think is ours.”
Modi received the message and made a truce in Wuhan in April 2018. After that, New Delhi implemented measures to placate Xi, including controlling the Tibetan diaspora. Modi spoke in June 2018 at the Shangri La Dialogue in Singapore, echoing Beijing in appealing against a “return to the era of great power rivalries” in the Indo-Pacific, effectively asserting that the United States had no place in the region.
A former foreign secretary, who spoke on condition of anonymity, believes that this evidence of Modi’s weakness only whetted Xi’s appetite. The Chinese leader concluded that he was managing to establish a psychological dominance over the Indian prime minister. And Xi wanted to consolidate that pre-eminence.
The Chinese leader saw a perfect opportunity in the circumstances that prevailed in April: a raging COVID-19 pandemic, New Delhi’s weakened position on the subcontinent, India’s unprecedented economic slowdown, and domestic US concern over the overwhelming 2020 electoral battle.
In addition to asserting his supremacy over Modi, Xi would also have aimed to show Washington that his putative regional partner could not even protect its territory from China. Finally, Xi also wanted to show the countries of the region the subordinate place of India, ”says the former PMO official.
That Modi is confused and intimidated became clear after the killing of 20 Indian soldiers in June, when he denied any Chinese intrusion into Indian territory. His statement implied that none of the territories occupied by the PLA belonged to India, and also that Indian soldiers were killed on Chinese territory.
The Chinese media quickly picked up on this issue. “Modi’s comments will be very helpful in easing tensions because, as Prime Minister of India, he has removed the moral basis for the hardliners to further blame China,” he wrote. Global times, quoting Lin Minwang from Fudan University.
There was a similar political incoherence in Defense Minister Rajnath Singh’s statement in Parliament on Tuesday, when he claimed that peace and quiet would prevail if the Chinese disassociated themselves. That implied that India’s claim to Aksai Chin was no longer crucial.
Even more surprising was Rajnath of Depsang’s omission from the list of places where the PLA had invaded the territory claimed by India. “If Modi had more control, he would have thought that would signal a deal package that involved making concessions at Depsang in exchange for Chinese concessions elsewhere. But, given Modi’s lack of visible leadership in a national crisis, Xi appears to have won, “said a former foreign secretary who did not want to be named.
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