NEW DELHI: Recent India-China agreements, between foreign ministers in Moscow on September 10 and military commanders on Tuesday, are intended to begin the process of limited disengagement and ensure continued ‘stalemate’ in the Line of Real control amid a deep trust deficit between the two parties.
Confirming that a significant disengagement would depend on the political intent of the Chinese leaders and their willingness to reduce escalation on the ground, Indian fonts He said the two joint statements should be read only to avoid provocative pushes at sticking points in LAC that could erupt into hostilities even as India remains prepared for all eventualities.
A key decision is to stop sending more troops to the front lines in eastern Ladakh and keep troops at a “safe” distance from each other and reopen real-time communications, which had been frozen. This is to ensure a halt to the relentless build-up of LAC, as a precursor to new steps in the disengagement exercise.
India will continue to insist on the status quo ante as in April, but the process has become more complicated after Indian forces occupied strategic heights in the south bank of Pangong Tso and they repositioned themselves on the north shore. This not only alters the post-Galwan situation, but also does not fit the ‘status quo’ that prevailed in April. Until the current confrontation, Indian troops patrolled the Finger 4-8 spurs but did not maintain the heights they took on the south bank in numerous operations from August 29-30. The move gave the Indians a strong situational advantage over Chinese positions. India is in no rush to vacate crucial peaks unless there is verifiable action leading to de-induction of PLA troops.
However, sources at Tuesday’s meeting said the discussions were reasonably positive. “The understanding is to keep the situation stable until an agreement on disengagement is reached, for which more rounds of talks have been proposed,” said a source. In future conversations, both parties will have the opportunity to test their intentions and the ability to follow through with their decisions.
Joint declarations must be followed by actions that reduce the dangerous proximity of Indian and Chinese troops and there is uncertainty as to whether the declarations signed by the Chinese Foreign Ministry have the necessary political sanction at the highest level. It is unclear from Indian sources whether the mismatch between the Chinese statements and actions is a plan or reflects contrary impulses in China’s political system.
What is clear is that India does not take anything for granted, even if joint declarations reduce, even if they do not eliminate, the possibility of conflict.
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