Jawaharlal Nehru and Dr. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan in this 1957 photo
NEW DELHI: In early 1957, a daring secret mission inside Aksai Chin that he saw an Indian army officer and a havildar join a group of disguised yak herders actually provided first-hand evidence that China had illegally built a highway in territory claimed by India.
Unfortunately, the efforts of Lieutenant Colonel RS Basera of the Kumaon Regiment and Havildar Diwan Singh of the Corps of Engineers failed despite the immense risks and difficulties they assumed as then Minister of Defense. VK Krishna Menon and then PM Jawaharlal nehru he remained skeptical about the exact location of the road. It would be two full years before the Indian government admitted in Parliament that the road had been built.
In a soon-to-be-released book, ‘End of an Era, India Leaves Tibet’, well-known China expert Claude Arpi has expounded in exhaustive detail, based on documents from the Nehru Memorial Library, declassified Indians and Chinese documents and personal interviews, how even voluminous reports from their own agencies about the ominous consolidation of the Chinese occupation of Tibet failed to push India to act.
The theme of the book is that India loses all its influence in Tibet, helping China push aggressive claims along the Indian border. This came at the cost of defrauding opinion in Tibet that admired “Chogyal Nehru” and felt that India could help them prevent the “synophication” of their culture and customs.
However, Arpi’s research indicates that India did have options. At the time, the Indian Air Force was clearly superior to China’s military air arm and could have helped aid the Tibetan resistance, which was significant. Diplomacy itself, given India’s strong presence through the malls, could have been forceful.
Indian reports from Tibet spoke of the speed with which passable roads were being built, but failed to move New Delhi. The roads allowed Chinese troops to quickly reach the Indian borders. The long preparation saw Mao Zedong, annoyed by the asylum for Dalai Lama and Nehru’s attempts to “undermine” China’s leadership in the Third World, to order attacks against Indian positions in October 1962.
Lieutenant Colonel Basera’s trip hit the road and he took his measurements. But upon their return, Menon and Nehru asked the director of military intelligence if the path could be confirmed by a map. However, the secret patrol did not carry maps for security reasons.
This was not the only evidence along the way. Even earlier, the British mountaineer Sidney Wignall went to Tibet with the knowledge of the Indian army. He was captured but released on a high pass and arrived in India after an incredible journey. His Aksai Chin road report was dismissed by Menon in Nehru’s presence as CIA propaganda.
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