[ad_1]
There is little doubt that after a gap of nearly two decades, Afghanistan is undergoing another major power overhaul. The Taliban, overthrown by the US-led military campaign after September 11, have reemerged as the nucleus of a new, but unfinished, constellation of power.
Unlike its previous avatar in the mid-1990s, when Pakistan was born and fed by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates with covert support from the United States, Taliban 2.0 is blatantly different.
Also read: India should speak directly to the Taliban, says US special envoy Zalmay Khalilzad
Except for India, former supporters of the Northern Alliance, a coalition of non-Pashtun ethnic groups that took over the Taliban, mainly Iran and Russia, have invested significantly in the Taliban’s new name. This has been eminently suitable for the Taliban, who yearn for recognition as a symbol of Afghan nationalism, rather than a haven for international terrorist groups, including Al-Qaeda, the architect of the twin tower bombing in New York.
There is strong evidence that the 2020 Taliban, unlike in the past, are entangling Afghanistan’s ethnic minorities in the emerging new power coalition in Kabul, rather than relying primarily on the majority of Pashtuns.
Regional influencers
To impart a more composite and pluralistic image, the Taliban rely heavily on regional influencers, particularly Iran, Russia, and Uzbekistan, indicating that the era of Pakistan’s virtual monopoly in directing the pre-2001 show in Kabul has ended. However, Islamabad, taking advantage of its deep assets, continues to exercise considerable influence in the Af-Pak wastelands, despite the Taliban’s attempt to link up with regional powers.
Also read: We are going to build ties in the neighborhood: Taliban
The Taliban depend on Iran to gain influence among ethnic Hazaras, who have shared deep historical and cultural ties with Tehran. Geographically, the Hazaras, who share Iran’s Shiite ties, reside mainly among the Koh-i-Baba mountains on the western fringe of the Hindukush mountain range in central Afghanistan.
Furthermore, Iran exercises influence over Afghanistan due to the port of Chabahar. In the future, a new, resource-rich, landlocked Afghanistan is unlikely to give up the option of using Chabahar, a port in the Indian Ocean, for its international trade, despite the attraction of Pakistani ports of Karachi and Gwadar, the starting point of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).
The Hindu He previously reported that in a Taliban video on April 22 featuring the group’s newly appointed governor of the group’s northern district, Mawlawi Mahdi Mujahid, the Shiite Hazara cleric. incites his brothers to fight “Jewish and Christian invaders” alongside the Talibannorth. The video is also aimed directly at “Shiite brothers and religious scholars in Qom,” a reference to the Shiite seminary city, 140 km south of Tehran.
Iran, for its part, has regularly engaged with the Taliban. A statement by the Iranian Foreign Ministry earlier this month detailed a phone conversation between Iran’s special representative in Afghanistan, Mohammad Ebrahim Taherian, with Taliban political leaders about the current political stalemate in Afghanistan between President Ashraf Ghani and former executive director Abdullah Abdullah. “The two sides also exchanged views on future developments in the negotiations between Afghans and comprehensive efforts to prevent the spread of the coronavirus in Afghanistan,” the statement added.
Diplomatic sources counted The Hindu that the Taliban are now on their way to naming Rashid Dostum as “quarterback” in the new dispensation that is yet to emerge but is taking shape behind the scenes. A former vice president, General Dostum, is an Uzbek ethnic group with a fortress in northern Afghanistan, near Amu Darya, on the border with Uzbekistan. Recently, he publicly opposed President Ghani after the controversial national elections.
International legitimacy
Diplomatic sources say it is only a matter of time before the Taliban gains international legitimacy. “The five permanent members would first like to ensure that the Taliban, on the ground, reject the presence of international terrorist groups, such as Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, in Afghanistan. That may follow the removal of UN sanctions and the eventual integration of the group, “said one diplomat. The Hindu. The main world powers are also concerned about the presence of the Haqqani network, the Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K), the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the Islamic Movement of East Turkistan (ETIM) and the Chechen fighters, among much others.
Observers say that while remaining vigilant, India may have no choice but to consider a conditional commitment to the Taliban. “India’s Taliban policy cannot focus narrowly on attacking Pakistan alone. Like other powers, the underlying motive should be to look at it from a broader regional and global perspective: fostering connectivity, trade, protecting the environment and the fight against terrorism, “says P. Stobdan, former ambassador to Kyrgyzstan, in a conversation with The Hindu. He acknowledged that “we cannot be sure whether the Taliban, as the legitimate ruler of Afghanistan, will create or break the entire chain of multiple jihadist networks created by Al-Qaeda and IS.”
The former diplomat noted that both Al-Qaeda and IS Ansar Ghazwa’tul Hind have had bases in Kashmir since 2017. “The Haqanni Network is another source of concern, especially as Pakistan may try to position Sirajuddin Haqqani, its strategic asset.” Taliban-led government in Kabul. “
.
[ad_2]
