It was in early October 1962 that Chairman Mao Zedong decided to launch a full-scale invasion to severely punish India. While the main offensive was to be in the eastern sector, coordinated operations would be undertaken in the western sector to capture areas up to the 1960 claim line in eastern Ladakh, resulting in the elimination of 43 Indian posts. Gaining control of all of Aksai Chin was essential in ensuring the safety of the Western Highway, which links Kashgarh in Xinjiang with Lhasa in Tibet.
The offensive of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) began on October 20, 1962, simultaneously in the eastern and western sectors. Operations at Aksai Chin were carried out in two phases. During Phase One (20-28 October 1962), the PLA went on to clear Indian posts at Daulat Beg Oldie, Galwan, on both sides of the shores of the Pangong Tso and Dungti-Demchok areas. Phase Two was launched after a three-week tactical pause on November 18, 1962 to capture the strategic Kailash Range.
Reorganizing the defenses of India
The Karakoram Range ends on the north side of the Pangong Tso. The Kailash Mountain Range originates from the southern shore and runs from northwest to southeast for more than 60 km. Kailash Ridge is characterized by rugged, rugged terrain with heights varying between 4,000 and 5,500m, and its key features include Helmet Top, Gurung Hill, Spanggur Gap, Muggar Hill, Mukhpari, Rezang La, and Rechin La. The Ridge overlooks Chushul Bowl; an important communications center.
The truce that followed Phase One was used by the Indian army to reorganize its defenses. The 3rd Infantry Division rose in Leh on October 26, 1962 under the command of Major General Budh Singh. The headquarters of the 114th Infantry Brigade was moved to Chushul, the 70th Infantry Brigade assumed responsibility for the Indus Valley Subsector and the I63rd Infantry Brigade was installed for the Defense of Leh.
Deployment in Chushul
The 114th Infantry Brigade responsible for the Chushul area had a front of around 40 km and was deployed as follows:
- 1/8 Gorkha Rifles covered the north side of Spanggur Gap. His two companies were deployed to Gurung Hill, another company was deployed to the north, and a fourth company was at Spanggur Gap with battalion headquarters along with an ad-hoc company at Chushul airfield.
- 13 Kumaon was on the south side of Spanggur Gap with two companies at Muggar Hill, one company at Rezang La, and a fourth company along with the battalion headquarters south of it.
- The headquarters of the brigade along with 1 JAT and two AMX troops 13 tanks of 20 Lancers were located in Chushul. The 13th Field Regiment minus one battery, equipped with 25 pound guns, was in support.
Chinese plan of attack
The plan, duly approved by the Central Military Commission (CMC), contemplated the capture of Rezang La and Gurung Hill simultaneously. Troops comprising three battalions from the PLA’s 4th Infantry Division along with supporting units were concentrated in the Retuzong area, some 40 km from the border. All of these units had also been in action during Phase One. According to CMC instructions, operations were to be limited to positions on the ridge line only. 📣 Express explained is now in Telegram. Click here to join our channel (@ieexplained) and stay up to date with the latest
Battle of Rezang La
Company C of 13 Kumaon, responsible for the defense of Rezang La, was deployed two platoons (Strong Points 7 and 9) with a third platoon and Company Headquarters at Point 5150 (Strong Point 8) in the center. In addition, there were support detachments of 3-inch mortars, heavy machine guns, and rocket launchers.
The Chinese, having carried out a detailed reconnaissance of Rezang La, planned to flank the position at night and simultaneously attack from the northern and southern directions at first light. Consequently, the attacking troops divided into two working groups. A task force, made up of the 3rd Battalion minus the 11th Regiment company, was to attack Strongpoint 9 from the south. The second task force, made up of two companies (one each from the 3rd Battalion of Regiments 10 and 11), was to attack Strong Point 8 from the north. The 3rd Battalion, minus the company, the ex-10. Regiment, and 3rd Cavalry, minus two companies, would act as reserves.
The two working groups left Retuzong at 8 pm on November 17 and were at their respective firm bases at 6 am on November 18. After a short artillery barrage, the attack began from both directions at 9:15 am. A fierce battle followed, with the defender repelling successive Chinese attacks. With communication disrupted and the position surrounded, leaving no chance for C Company to be reinforced, it was a “life and death” situation. Major Shaitan Singh, the company commander, even launched a local counterattack. Finally, by employing reserves, the Chinese managed to break through and Rezang La fell at 10 p.m. on November 18.
It was an epic battle, literally fought to the “last man, last round”. Of the total 141 troops in Rezang La, 135 fought to the end and 5 were taken prisoner, with only one survivor. Major Shaitan Singh was posthumously awarded the Param Vir Chakra. The Chinese suffered 21 dead and 98 wounded.
Battle for Gurung Hill
Gurung Hill was owned by two 1/8 GR companies (Strengths 16, 5 and 6) located to the northeast in Spanggur Gap. Strong Point 16, the most dominant feature, was at an elevation of 5,100 m. It was in the hands of one company but one platoon. The defenses were well coordinated and covered by a protective minefield. The position was supported by a troop of AMX 13 light tanks.
The task of capturing Gurung Hill was assigned to Detachment Ali, the retention formation. A force of eight sections was assembled and duly reinforced by a platoon of engineers and flamethrowers, a heavy machine gun, a 57mm recoilless cannon, and twelve 82mm mortars for fire support. A company of the 3rd Cavalry would act as a reserve.
The operation to capture Gurung Hill began at 9:22 am on November 18, coordinated with the attack on Rezang La. It was preceded by a brief artillery barrage. Faced with stiff resistance from Gorkhas with tanks in a direct firing role, the Chinese suffered heavy casualties and the attack stalled. By regrouping and joining the reinforcements, the PLA resumed the offensive at 11 a.m. After repeating repeated attacks without reinforcements arriving, the position was captured by the PLA towards the last light of November 18. The intensity of the fighting can be measured from the casualties: 1/8 of GR suffered 50 dead and several wounded, while the Chinese sustained more than 80 (killed and wounded). The PLA was unable to capture the remaining part of Gurung Hill, namely Strong Points 5 and 6.
While only Rezang La and part of Gurung Hill had been captured, the decision was made at the highest level to withdraw from Kailash Ridge and redeploy west of Chushul on the night of December 19. The Chinese did not follow the retreating troops or leave. for the Chushul airfield. The PLA only had the plus division for operations in Aksai Chin and was therefore seriously forced to undertake other operations. On the other hand, the 3rd Indian Infantry Division had the ability to launch a limited counter-offensive. After declaring a ceasefire on November 21, Chinese troops fell back to deep positions due to logistical constraints.
August 2020: the present
The course of history was reversed 58 years later, when. On August 30, 2020, Special Border Force (SFF) troops secured Kailash Ridge as a preventive operation, taking the PLA by surprise. This action turned out to be a game changer, neutralizing the advances made by the Chinese along the north bank of Pangong Tso and rendering the PLA positions east of the Spanggur Gap-Maldo garrison totally vulnerable. The reason the PLA did not go after Kailash Ridge initially as part of its aggression in May 2020 could be for two plausible reasons: First, a shortage of infantry such as the now-motorized 4th Infantry Division unfit to support itself. firm, and second, a presumption that the Indian army will not dare to undertake proactive counterattacks.
In 1962, it was at Kailash Ridge that Indian soldiers proved their worth and made the PLA pay a heavy price, despite being ill-equipped and ill-prepared. Today, given rich experience in high-altitude warfare with glaciers, coupled with vastly improved equipment and infrastructure, the Indian Army is well positioned to maintain the Kailash Range forever. The Chinese, on the other hand, are beginning to realize the harsh reality of winters on the Royal Line of Control (LAC).
Aware of the inability to regain Kailash Ridge at the current level of force, and with the window for launching major operations already canceled due to the onset of winter, the Chinese can use all stratagems to negotiate the withdrawal of the Indian army from the south. by Pangong Tso. . India must beware of past mistakes and avoid falling into the Chinese trap. The current aggression by the PLA, in which it breached a series of agreements signed between countries over the last three decades to unilaterally alter the status quo throughout LAC, is an example of this.
Kailash Ridge marks a rendezvous with history, a turning point, as it is the first part of territory to be recovered from illegal Chinese occupation, but it is definitely not the last, as India’s claim line is the Johnson Line of 1865. Foreign Affairs S Jaishankar recently said that India was being tested in the seven-month confrontation with China in eastern Ladakh. Therefore, it is time to convey a stern message to the Chinese leadership that India will not compromise its sovereignty.
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