The joint statement after the seventh round of military talks between India and China had a positive tone but not a breakthrough. What is your assessment of progress since the September 10 meeting between the two foreign ministers in Moscow?
The fact that joint declarations are issued can be positively assessed. But then if the meetings were to end without a joint statement, it would imply that minimal common ground could not be found and that a deadlock has occurred. Neither side wants to give the impression that the talks have broken down. They want to keep communication channels open, otherwise the chances of encountering an armed conflict increase. On the five points agreed by the Foreign Ministers, no visible progress can be seen. There was no disconnection. In the sixth round of military talks it was agreed not to place more troops on the border, but with 40 to 50,000 soldiers already concentrated, the need for more can be dispensed with.
What is the reason for the stagnation? There is also no mention of a return to the status quo ante if we look at the most recent statements from the military and diplomatic talks. Why is that?
China has committed aggression. It seeks to change the land position in its favor by occupying disputed areas patrolled by Indian forces until now. It seeks to impose by force its own version of the LAC (Line of Current Control). Now he talks about the 1959 that even (former Prime Minister Jawaharlal) Nehru had rejected. India cannot accept this loss of claim on its own territory and thus stagnation. The immediate need is to disconnect if a conflict is to be avoided, as in the Pangong Tso area, the forces are very close and, given what happened in Galwan and the changed rules of engagement on our side that now allow the use of weapons from fire. To protect yourself, things can get out of hand. Restoring the status quo ante can realistically be discussed only after the disconnect occurs and is followed by a decline.
So you’re saying that the possibilities of another violent confrontation cannot be ruled out?
This is a genuine concern. It seems that in the north of Pangong Tso the forces are very close, and in the south they are at a hearing distance. After what happened in Galwan, our distrust of China has grown exponentially. In southern Pangong Tso, the Chinese had tried to use primitive tactics of using nailed bats, etc. to evict us from one of our positions and it appears to have been shot there and also in northern Pangong Tso, according to reports. Any impulsive act under pressure by either party could result in a much bigger confrontation than in the Galwan Valley due to the use of firearms. The Chinese will be cautious to avoid this, and so will we, but the risk is there, and hence the emphasis on disconnection, which is not a simple process, let’s say it.
Both soldiers seem ready to spend the winter in the heights of Ladakh. Is that also your assessment?
We’re running out of time. Once the passes are closed towards the end of November, the redeployment of forces to summer positions will no longer be possible. Recognizing this, the Indian side has made preparations for the winter deployment. In very difficult conditions, a large operation has been carried out to store fuel and supplies, fixing winter clothes and tents. Now we should expect the forces to overwinter at these extreme heights. This show of determination on our side sends a strong message to the Chinese, who will also feel the pressure of the winter rollout. The Chinese have sunk into an unviable position and have forced us to respond.
At the last Quad meeting (October 6 in Tokyo), India did not mention China by name. Neither Japan nor Australia. The United States was the only one to denounce China’s actions. Was this a missed opportunity for India to speak out firmly against China’s aggressive behavior?
Aside from the formal statements, Quad is actually aiming to counter the growing Chinese threat. For diplomatic reasons, there is reluctance to publicly project Quad as being led by China, although the Chinese see it as such. Japan and Australia have huge economic interests in China and want to limit their ambitions through pressure, not open confrontation. The United States, which views China as a strategic adversary and has become a problem in the presidential elections, explains why it is speaking out on Quad’s development of a security framework. Although India is cautious in its remarks, its participation in Quad at the ministerial level is a sign in itself. With border negotiations under way with China for a non-military solution, India would like to avoid complications. There will be enough opportunities for India in the future to call out China for its aggressive conduct.
Is India still too sensitive to China’s fundamental interests? Isn’t it time to rethink? And linked to this, do you agree with United States Under Secretary Stephen Biegun that India and the United States have been too cautious?
Yes, in the face of China repeatedly rejecting constitutional changes at J&K and failing to recognize Arunachal Pradesh, India’s response seems timid. If China constantly undermines our strategic interests internationally and regionally and uses military pressure at the border in repudiation of all existing border agreements, India has to retaliate. China defines its fundamental interests unilaterally, but reciprocity is required for others to recognize those interests. China is an elephant in the room as a result of the policies of the United States, not India. India took on China in Doklam and is now doing so in Ladakh, while the United States did not reject it in the South China Sea. China’s territorial claims on India stem from its occupation of Tibet, forcing us to modify our existing policy on Tibet.
Going back to the Quad meeting, there was no joint statement after the talks. Without a joint statement, was the group able to show unity or alignment in opinions?
The United States reportedly pushed for a joint statement with an explicit reference to the threat from China, the need for a security framework, and China’s responsibility for Covid-19. Trump’s electoral needs would have needed a strong statement. Quad’s agenda covers other areas as well, be it connectivity, humanitarian and disaster relief cooperation, medical care, and counter-terrorism, and this broader Quad agenda was highlighted in India’s statement. . The emphasis in the country statements may have been different, but they were not in conflict with each other. India has supported Quad’s regular meetings, marking its commitment to the group. A united front against China is being built, but at a pace that will depend on China’s future policies and actions.
How do you see the evolution of the “Quad” in the coming years? Do you see it acquiring a military dimension? Do you see other countries – New Zealand, Vietnam or Indonesia – join the “Quad” group?
President Xi Jinping’s ambitions to make China a preeminent power will not change. China is concentrating on areas that enable the achievement of this goal: leadership in the development of new technologies, control over critical raw materials, and connectivity tied to the Chinese economy. You can’t take a step back without repercussions both at home and abroad. China needs to get out of the first island chain for which it is building its navy at a rate never seen before. A stronger Quad will be an obvious answer. Quad members emphasize the centrality of ASEAN in not dividing Asia, but the need is to co-opt key ASEAN countries such as Vietnam and Indonesia. With China spreading its tentacles in the Pacific, New Zealand could join. Quad already has a military dimension, with the US-India-Japan Malabar trilateral exercise that Australia can join.
The United States under President Donald Trump has talked a lot about China. Do you think that one of the reasons India is not calling China is because we are not sure what the US policy will be towards Beijing after the November elections?
America’s policy on China after the upcoming presidential election will certainly have an impact on how India will handle China. However, we have problems with China that are unrelated to US-China relations. These existed when the ties between the United States and China were strong. The problems are China’s hegemonic ambitions in Asia for which India is an obstacle, its occupation of Tibet, claims in Indian territory, building Pakistan strategically against us, the CPEC, undermining us in our neighborhood, opposing our membership in the GSN , protect Pakistan terrorism, etc. Of course, US pressure on China serves our interests. We are partners in fighting China’s maritime threats in particular.
Do you see any change in world opinion regarding China after the spread of the pandemic and its aggressive behavior towards its neighbors?
Yes, China is now seen as an aggressive expansionist power by the United States in particular, and Europe is also increasingly aware of its systemic differences with China, the threat it poses to European unity, the lack of reciprocity in trade. and disgust for his authoritarian model. . There is a backlash against his Belt and Road Initiative in parts of Africa. China’s debt trap policies have been exposed in Sri Lanka. Western countries and Australia are closing the doors to 5G. China’s treatment of the Wuhan virus, rejection of all responsibility, and its wolf warrior diplomacy have alienated the public in many countries. His aggression in Ladakh has consolidated his negative image. This is helping us with some of our neighbors, in the Maldives in particular. Our supply of one submarine to Myanmar is a significant advance, balancing the sale of two submarines from China to Bangladesh.
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