For the past 58 years, the Chinese propaganda machine, or psychological war machine, has used the border conflict of 1962 to put the Indian army on the defensive and convey to the nation at large that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is far superior to his Indian army. counterpart on the battlefield.
It is the same mentality that caused the PLA to transgress the finger 4 mountain spur on the northern shores of Pangong Tso, as well as to break the Royal Line of Control (LAC) in Galwan. Chinese arrogance, however, took a hit both in Galwan and on both shores of the lake, with the Indian army occupying dominant positions and, in effect, threatening the PLA garrison in Moldo through the Spanggur Gap in the Chushul sector. .
Caught off guard by the Indian army’s maneuvers on August 29-30, a disgruntled PLA decided to place an anti-aircraft gun at Black Top, south of Pangang Tso, and deployed the main battle tanks to scare the Indians. The PLA propaganda machine is screaming war with India, not realizing that the tools of today’s war are weapons of engagement and not WWII machines like tanks.
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While India and China, through their foreign ministers, have decided to disconnect from Ladakh, the exercise is very complicated and will take time despite the best efforts of both Corps Commanders. The withdrawal must be done in such a way as to provide mutual security and not an opportunity for the incorrigible PLA to fill the vacant posts by the Indian Army due to better border infrastructure and logistics. The best option available is the status quo as it existed in early April and anything less than that is an exercise in obfuscation.
While the Chinese harp on the loss of India in 1962, the fact is that the current Indian army does not fight with Lee Enfield .303 bolt-action rifles, light machine guns, three-inch mortars and light tanks. A transparent battlefield in Ladakh will surely tell the Chinese ruler in Beijing that the deployment of Indian troops north and south of Pangong Tso is greater than the total deployed during the 1962 war.
It is clear to leading Indian diplomats and military commanders that the war, if forced by the PLA, will cause more casualties on both sides in the first 15 minutes than the entire 1962 war due to engagement weapons, laser-guided bombs and missiles beyond visual range. deployed on both sides.
They understand that tanks and troops on the ground will have little role to play except holding and capturing territory, as big guns and rockets will take over the scene of war.
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Despite the Chinese ruler and his Western theater commander being blinded by ambition to show the world that a new global power has arrived, India has enough weapons of engagement and deterrence to ensure that the PLA receives a major impact on the already sensitive province of Tibet and Xinjiang.
A strong response from India may undo the one-China policy, but the reverse could also be true and erode New Delhi’s fairness. It is time for Beijing to wake up to the harsh reality on the ground, as it is about an army that has been fighting at heights of up to 24,000 feet since 1984 and the insurgency in both Kashmir and the Northeast since independence. The 1962 war no longer puts the Indian army on the defensive, but encourages force.
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