September 13, 2020 4:16:46 am
The Indian Army called the move “preventive” as it noticed PLA troops moving into previously unmanned locations.
On the night of August 29-30, nearly four months after the PLA made a significant entry into Indian territory in eastern Ladakh, India, for the first time, overtook China with its maneuvers.
By dawn, Indian forces had taken commanding positions at some key heights along the Royal Line of Control (LAC), snaking across the southern shore of Pangong Tso to Rechin La near Rezang La.
This move threatened key Chinese positions on its LAC side and provided India with a bulwark against lost ground on the north shore of the lake.
The Indian army called the move “preventive” as it noticed PLA troops moving into previously unmanned locations.
However, this operation to reach the vacant heights took nearly a month of careful planning, from the drawing board to implementation in the field.
Plans for such a move, said a source in the security establishment, had the political go-ahead from Delhi because it was understood there that Beijing was not taking the completion of the troop withdrawal seriously.
After the success of the Corps Commander-level talks on June 30 that led to the withdrawal of troops at Patrol Point 14 in the Galwan Valley, hopes of a total disconnect were high. But by July 14, the fourth round of talks, it was clear that China was not completely withdrawing its troops from the Gogra Post and Hot Spring areas, and the ridges of the Fingers area on the north shore of Pangong Tso.
When the August 2 meeting ended and China was not even willing to accept that it had violated Indian territory on the north shore of Pangong Tso, the Indian establishment realized that military action to gain some tactical advantage was the only option. .
An important Army source said that “plans are always ready for all steps and are shared with very few people.” “Planning does not begin when talks fail” and “forces prepare multiple plans”, bearing in mind that the outcome of the talks can never be predicted. “When to bring them into play is the question,” said the source.
The final plan, the source said, had been in place for more than fifteen days before the action. “Two weeks before it happened, the seriousness of putting weight on this particular action started to win out. Then the ground commanders came here to make presentations. “
“The higher ups and the field officers sat down with the drawing board. The Chinese vulnerabilities were resolved in the face of our own strength. Tactical advantage locations were discussed. Strategies were worked out to achieve them. Each and every movement, down to the last detail, was mapped. And just before the operations, a reconnaissance was carried out. It took me about a month to do all of this, in complete secrecy. With a bit of luck on our side, it was accomplished without much fuss, ”said the source.
An official from the security establishment said that each height on the south bank was assigned to a particular unit. “There were three forces at our disposal: the Special Border Force (SFF), the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) and, of course, the Indian Army. Units were specifically selected to take over particular heights with SFF commandos leading in many places, ”the officer said.
Sources said the operation, which lasted through the night of August 30-31, helped India take positions in the heights surrounding Black Top and Helmet Top. “The Chinese continue to dominate Black Top and Helmet Top, but we have surrounded them at heights around them. Although perceptions of LAC differ, we are still on our side, ”said an intelligence official.
What has irritated China, the official said, is India’s positions around Rezang La and Rechin La. “The positions we have taken in the Chushul sector at heights like Magar Hill and Gurung Hill have exposed the Moldo garrison of China and the Spanggur gap, strategically very important for China,” the official said.
Gurung Hill and Magar Hill lie to the north and south of the Spanggur Gap, and Indian positions can dominate the pass to effectively close it off for any Chinese move – in 1962, China had used the 2km-wide pass to launch a offensive against India. cash.
It was in the Chushul sector that SFF soldier Nyima Tenzin was killed during the Aug. 29-30 operation when he stepped on a landmine as he and a younger colleague advanced ahead of the troops.
The importance of the operation in Rezang La is also underscored by the fact that since August 29, there have been two cases of shooting in the area, for the first time in 45 years across LAC. While China reacted to a shooting incident on September 7, calling it a “grave provocation”, sources said the first shooting was fired on the night of August 30.
“It was then that the PLA tried to push the Indian forces near Rezang La, where they had captured some key heights. There were shots in the air. Also on September 7, the dismissal occurred in the same sector for the same reason, ”said an official from the security establishment.
While neither party commented on the first shooting incident, they blamed each other for the September 7 shootings. The Indian Army denied having opened fire along the LAC, or that it had crossed the LAC.
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