Updated: September 14, 2020 10:16:44 am
An Indian fighter jet flies over a mountain range in Leh. (Reuters photo)
How dangerous is the situation given the amount of the People’s Liberation Army, the firepower and the area they are occupying?
the People’s Liberation Army it has deployed more than two regular divisions (around 40,000 soldiers) along with supporting weapons, logistics services and air force along the eastern Ladakh front line and as a backup. India also has around two regular army divisions supported by the Indian Air Force in this sector now.
Along the Current Line of Control (LAC), the PLA has now occupied many areas that were previously considered ‘contested’, that is, that lie between China and India’s perceptions of LAC.
At Finger 4, north of Pangong Tso, enemy troops are deployed a few hundred meters away. About him south shore of Pangong TsoThey are occupying heights that bypass each other’s military camps and vital road communications.
With such a large and close deployment, along with the lack of confidence after the [June 15-16] Galwan Incident [in which 20 Indian soldiers were killed], the preventive occupation of the Kailash Mountain Range by Indian troops from August 29 to 30, and the provocative action of the PLA on September 7 [when shots were fired along the LAC for the first time in 45 years], the situation on the ground, especially in Chushul sector, it is indeed very tense and explosive.
Plus, the charges and counter-charges that fly thick and fast only add to the tension.
What does the dominance of the finger area by the Chinese mean for India?
On the north shore of Pangong Tso, there are eight large finger-shaped spurs that descend to the Tso (lake). From the heights along these foothills, military activity can be observed on the north and south banks of Pangong Tso.
The Chinese and Indian (perceived) LACs are about 8 kilometers apart (between finger 4 and finger 8) in this area. In May, the PLA occupied this contested area, deploying troops on finger 4, and blockading Indian troops, who previously patrolled the areas up to finger 8.
The theater of the conflict around Pangong Tso (Reuters)
What are the advantages India gains from occupying the heights in the Chushul sector?
The heights of the mountains allow the observation of the adversary’s military activities in the (visible) area and the ability to launch precise direct and indirect fire on the chosen enemy target.
What if the talks don’t lead to any disconnection on the ground?
In the current situation, it will be a long road both on the diplomatic and military fronts. Indian forces on the ground must remain vigilant to ensure that the PLA does not take advantage of any advantage during the pause created by a long diplomatic engagement.
Remember, it took almost six years to diplomatically resolve the Sumdorong Chu incident (1986).
The Chinese are also present near Demchok and Sub Sector North. How does India deal with that?
In Demchok, the PLA has opposed India’s non-military development activities (roads and water canals) for the civilian population of India. About 90 km from Demchok, in Chumar, he had made territorial claims and military advances in September 2014.
There has been an LAC-related dispute in the Depsang Plains in the northern subsector. In April 2013, PLA troops established a temporary camp in our area, but then withdrew. They have reoccupied some area claimed by us. This has resulted in an additional deployment of troops, including armor and artillery on both sides.
All these disputes in eastern Ladakh and elsewhere are related to LAC, which has not been delineated on maps. India has made many efforts, even at the highest level, but the Chinese have flatly refused. An ambiguous LAC allows the Chinese to continue with frequent one-off activities and thus maintain political and military pressure on India.
In recent incidents, China has deliberately violated all of LAC’s confidence-building agreements and perceived alignment so far. Unless LAC is delineated on the map, without prejudice to the final boundary agreement, such violations of the Indian Territory by the PLA are likely to continue as they are strategically tailored to China.
How will India cope if the eastern and central sectors also see a similar situation to Ladakh?
The situation in eastern Ladakh has already led to tension and the deployment of additional troops throughout LAC and vulnerable points in the central and eastern sectors. This has become necessary due to the breach of trust with China.
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What logistical challenges will Indian troops face in establishing defenses in the coming months?
Never before have we deployed such large forces (Army, Air Force and paramilitary forces) in Ladakh. Since road access to Ladakh will not be available between mid-November and mid-May (2021), the winter storage requirement for civilians and military is enormous. The IAF will continue to be strongly committed to essential daily maintenance and troop movement when necessary.
What are the chances that the Ladakh situation will lead to conflict? Is there a weather window?
Climatically, the chances of intense conflict remain high until mid-November. The winter months will reduce the intensity, but we cannot expect a complete strike. Air and ground surveillance, infantry and artillery deployments will continue.
How important will the IAF’s role be in the event of armed conflict?
Today, no situation of armed conflict can be imagined without synergy and unity between the armed forces.
The IAF plays a crucial role at the strategic and operational levels. In addition to its primary role of protecting airspace and vulnerable areas / assets, it will actively participate in aerial reconnaissance, destroying enemy targets, and providing tactical and logistical support to the Army.
An Indian army soldier stands guard over his vehicle as a convoy moves along the Srinagar-Ladakh highway in Gagangeer on Sept. 1, 2020 (AP Photo: Mukhtar Khan).
What are the chances that this situation will turn into a two-front threat with Pakistan also supporting China?
China and Pakistan are already involved in a ‘collusive threat’ (committed to declared secret or hidden objectives) with respect to India.
China is unlikely to rely on Pakistan’s collaboration or involvement in a large-scale conflict with India. In the current scenario, however, limited military collaboration between China and Pakistan in the Karakoram Pass region cannot be ruled out. Its manifestations could be the activation of military diversionary movements by Pakistan in the Siachen and Kargil sectors, and an intensification of the conditions of proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir.
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What else can the government of India do to facilitate the elaboration of a long-term strategy for China or to negotiate a solution?
National security, particularly issues related to armed conflict, requires a “whole of government” approach.
Unfortunately, in India we have not lost the habit of working in ministerial silos and smokestacks which in the past have often resulted in military operations that do not achieve the desired strategic objectives. Unlike Western democratic nations, our ministers and civil servants are still shy about involving military personnel directly in formulating defense policies or negotiating such matters with foreign political leaders.
Vice President General Malik (retired) was the Army Chief of Staff who led India to victory in the 1999 Kargil War against Pakistan. He is well versed in the challenges of high-altitude deployments, having commanded an infantry brigade in Jammu and Kashmir and a mountain division before leading a corps and commando. He was also president of the Committee of Chiefs of Staff.
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