The deployment of at least 50,000 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops along the Royal Line of Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh and in the occupied Aksai Chin region, in addition to heavy weaponry and missiles, is indicative of Russian influence not only on the Chinese. military equipment, but also in the planning and execution of the war, according to a senior officer in the Indian Air Force (IAF).
The officer, who analyzed the Chinese positioning and worst-case war plan for HT on condition of anonymity, said a Chinese offensive, when it occurs, is likely to involve troops advancing under a barrage of artillery and rockets. fire, with batteries of surface-to-air missiles that protect their weapons systems from IAF attacks. “This is the old Soviet way of waging war, with troops based in depth areas (in this case, the Hotan air base 320 km from the Royal Line of Control) providing the air defense cover,” added the officer. .
While several strategic experts believe that any future war will be fought with engagement weapons used to force Indian fighters to stay on the ground, the IAF’s strategy of “disperse, absorb, recover and retaliate” has been used in warfare. enough times (including at Exercise Gagan Shakti 2018) to repel China’s plans, the official said. He explained that the IAF’s reaction to any offensive is faster than that of the PLA Air Force due to the LAC’s distance from air bases such as Hotan, Lhasa, or Kashgar, and that the PLA’s surface-to-air missile sites become vulnerable. to the air-to-surface missiles of the Indian fighters. “Once the air defense missile systems are destroyed, the artillery, rockets and accumulated troop concentrations are exposed in the Tibetan desert, where there is no natural camouflage cover for these systems,” the official said.
The aforementioned official further said that while the PLA has filled the deep areas with troops, any aggression in mountainous terrain will not be easy against an entrenched adversary like the Indian army in Ladakh. The Kargil war of 1999 taught the Indian army that when the aggressor is focused and exposed, he becomes vulnerable to aerial interdiction. This makes the effort to attack Indian troops, who dominate strategic heights in both the north and south of Pangong Tso, more difficult in the winter months. Even a Chinese engagement weapon, given its circular probability error (a measure of precision), can have difficulty targeting entrenched troops sitting on mountain tops at subpolar temperatures and in the absence of cover from attacking forces in the the cold desert of Ladakh and the plains of Soda, he added.
The officer was confident that Indian forces could sustain a worst-case Chinese attack.The army is poised for an intensive 10-day war, with the Narendra Modi government allowing emergency purchases of critical missiles and ammunition after the 2016 Uri surgical strikes and the 2019 Balakot strikes against Pakistan. “It is unlikely that any hostility between India and China will continue at an intense level without global intervention beyond 10 days,” the officer explained, adding that indigenous ammunition is available for 40 days and conventional bombs for 60 days. .
With four or five additional Rafale fighters, in which IAF pilots are training in France, ready to join Ambala squad next month, and a new Ladakh corps commander, Lt. Gen. PGK Menon, taking over. Both armies seem pretty evenly matched, he said.
In the tensions that began in early May, Indian and Chinese troops have clashed face to face at multiple points throughout LAC. In some of these areas, particularly the Finger Area and Depsang, Indian forces have been cut off from points that they could previously patrol. But the Indian Army now controls the positions of the ridges on the southern shore of the lake that allow it to fully dominate the sector and monitor Chinese military activity, with the positions scattered at Rezang La, Reqin Pass, Gurung Hill and the heights. of Magar.
The Indian Army has also taken control of the key heights dominating PLA deployments on the Finger 4 ridge on the north shore of Pangong Tso, where rival soldiers are deployed just a few hundred meters from each other.
Last week, Defense Minister Rajnath Singh told lawmakers in Parliament that no force in the world can prevent the Indian army from patrolling the country’s borders in the Ladakh sector, indicating a firm determination to recover access to various areas that are now difficult to reach due to Chinese military actions throughout LAC, even as the focus of multiple diplomatic and military talks between the two sides has been “to disconnect and reduce escalation.”
Lieutenant General AS Lamba (retired), former Deputy Chief of the Army General Staff, said: “The situation in LAC is escalating despite intensive diplomatic efforts by India and talks between military commanders (from both nations). It requires complete operational readiness throughout LAC to prevent any reckless action by China. “
.
