They switched to drones so that the Azeris could win the war against the Armenians.

When news of the resurgence of fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh began to take place on September 27, 2020, experts waited with mixed emotions to continue. The conflict that arose with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and which has so far not been resolved has so far been characterized by the then-loser Azerbaijan who engages in fighting from time to time and then retreats after heavy casualties. In 2016, during the so-called four-day war, it was only able to recover a few ridges, despite the fact that the first unmanned Israeli drones had already appeared in the Azerbaijani arsenal.

Early footage from the current fighting also seemed to demonstrate this, with video footage of Azerbaijani tanks and fighting vehicles marching fired at each other by well-trained Armenian defenders.

It took weeks for the broad lines of the current conflict to emerge, and it became clear that we were facing something we had never seen before.

Azerbaijan has significantly increased its defense spending in recent years. It was no secret to the international community, which came as a surprise at spending hundreds of millions of dollars a year. In the current fighting, it is increasingly evident that Baku, with the help of Turkey, has carried out a significant capacity increase, which means that it has expanded its fleet of drones to such an extent that it has been able to alter the balance of power. in recent years.

Spectacular superiority of drones

In previous decades, the former center of power, Russia, has played an important role in both the military and political spheres. Moscow’s military bases secured Yerevan’s international borders on Armenian territory, especially against Turkey and Azerbaijan, allowing Armenian leaders to dedicate all their resources to supporting their Karabakh brothers. Moscow was the largest supplier of weapons to the Azeris and Armenians, while as co-chair of the so-called Minsk Group (along with the French and the Americans) it was also the main coordinator of the ceasefires and peace talks. This state ensured the maintenance of centuries-old Russian influence in the Caucasus.

Over the years, of course, Baku has grown increasingly frustrated with this dual policy and wanted to change. However, until now he has had no one to turn to. Turkey and the ErdoganThe government’s increasingly spectacular role in foreign policy offered an opportunity to change course. It is also clear from the news that in recent years, Ankara has increasingly represented its own power interests, if need be, even at the cost of fighting with its traditional partner, the U.S. The tough measures taken in Iraq, Syria, Libya and, later this year, in the eastern Mediterranean basin have predicted an appreciation for the role of Turkey, which was previously only rhetorically strong in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.

It was crucial that Ankara, through its own military technical developments, using the aforementioned drones, caught up with an important area of ​​current military modernization trends in the use of UAVs. The names of the Bayraktar TB-2 and ANKA drones, the MAM-L and MAM-C smart missiles, have only been learned by the international community in the last two to three years, when these systems have been used successfully not only against the Kurdish insurgents but also against Syrian insurgents. or against the Russian air defense complexes controlled by Libya.

Azerbaijan’s “drone war” started slowly, but then grew powerful, causing staggeringly large losses on the other side. Baku regularly posts lurid videos of these airstrikes, making it relatively easy for analysts to count Armenian losses. To October 23

then two dozen anti-aircraft missile systems, 144 tanks, some 300 trucks and jeeps, more than a hundred artillery devices and rocket launchers were destroyed, mostly by Turkish Israeli drones, in fewer numbers.

Of course, both sides are waging a propaganda war over the other side’s losses, but neither the Karabakh advocates nor Yerevan have so far been able to substantiate their own claims with similar pictorial material.

The demoralizing effect of Azerbaijani videos, which are also widely available on the Internet, cannot be ignored. See the Armenian soldiers peacefully preparing in the images, having no idea of ​​the impending danger. Drones are effective day and night, according to the videos, and can be any target that can be seen from the sky. Although the Armenians claim that more than 200 drones have been destroyed so far, only one Turkish device has been registered so far. Therefore, the Karabakh leadership seems powerless against the supremacy of the Azerbaijani drones for the moment, their only hope is some kind of Russian help, a change in climatic and geographical conditions.

Can the balance of power be reversed?

Over the past month, Azerbaijan has been able to register significant territorial gains, particularly in areas along Iran’s southern border. In this context, it should be remembered that Nagorno-Karabakh obtained its independence not only in the area of ​​the previous autonomy, but also in the territories occupied between 1992 and 1994, which were the provinces of Azerbaijan. The current successes greatly affect these areas, although the city of Hadrut and its surroundings were originally part of the Karabakh autonomy. Based on the fighting so far, Baku’s main objective is likely to be to reach the village of Lachin via a south-north offensive, where Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia are the closest to each other, and what is the closest route important between the two Armenian communities. It is possible to reach the ancient inhabited city of Sushi / Susha by this route, which was already the scene of bloody clashes from 1992-1994.

Based on the current state of fighting, Azerbaijan has been able to recapture 15 to 25 percent of the Karabakh territories, with at least three of the seven Azerbaijani districts outside the Karabakh autonomous territories but occupied by Armenians so far.

There is only accurate data on the number of military casualties on the Armenian side, Baku does not publish statistics, he claims, until the conflict ends. The Armenian data on Azerbaijani victims speak of thousands at the beginning of the conflict, which is generally treated with reservations by the international community. It has become a benchmark in recent days Vladimir Putin also on this topic. At the annual international forum, the Valdai Club meeting, the Russian president estimated the number of victims at roughly half to 5,000.

Between November and December, if a working ceasefire does not take effect by then, the chances of Armenian defenders fighting may increase. Regarding the most critical drone warfare, Armenians can rely on deteriorating weather conditions (freezing weather, fog) and more active Russian support (especially in the field of electronic warfare). The central Nagorno-Karabakh area is a plateau protected by two high mountain ranges that can be well protected along the roads leading to the area. He is also in favor of the Armenians that the closer Azeri attackers get to the original areas of Karabakh, the more they will find themselves with built and deeply articulated defense lines that can protect themselves from drone “eyes” in forested areas. Obviously, the fact that they fight for their own accommodation will also strengthen the morale of the Armenians (and weaken the Azeris).

In the context of its military successes so far, Azerbaijan must also keep in mind that it must also preserve and secure newly acquired territories, which means that the more parts it recovers, the more soldiers it will need who will not fight on the front line but provide inside. On the Azerbaijani side, there are hundreds or even thousands of Syrian militants who are “provided” by Turkey as a form of support. However, the real fighting value of these groups is in doubt, since both the climatic conditions and the geographical characteristics are alien to them (not to mention the different cultural origins), so their presence serves more propaganda and political purposes.

Diplomatic efforts in Moscow and Washington

At the outbreak of the Karabakh conflict, Moscow reflexively acted as a mediator. However, the first two “humanitarian ceasefires” on October 1 and 2 lasted only a few minutes. At this stage of the conflict, both parties still believed in their own victory. The US and French involvement of the Minsk Group will remain invisible for a long time, which is compounded by the fact that the Trump administration was so uninterested in this conflict that it has not yet appointed an ambassador-level representative in the Group of Minsk. The effectiveness of the French participation is greatly diminished by the deteriorating relationship of Macron’s leadership with Turkish President Erdogan over the years, as well as the outspoken sympathy of the French elite for the Armenians.

The first substantial moment of American involvement was the Armenian-Azerbaijani-American trial in Washington on October 23. Mike pompeo where another ceasefire was agreed, scheduled for October 26. But even with this, as before, it collapsed within a few hours. Of course, the American inaction can also be explained by the proximity of the presidential election on November 3, which means that no more activity is expected from the White House on issues that do not contribute substantially to the re-election of President Trump.

If we look for something in common in the American, French and Russian statements of the Minsk Group, it is clear that it is the role of Turkey. Neither these three countries nor the European Union want Ankara to participate in the diplomatic settlement and negotiations. Such a move would significantly transform Russia’s outlook, as it would be the first time since the disintegration of the Soviet Union that a dispute in one of the former Soviet Union member states apostrophized as a foreigner would be resolved through non-Russian intervention.

In a broader sense, the Karabakh conflict also means the failure of the Russian defense in a region that has been under the influence of Moscow for centuries. The loss of space for the United States as a consequence of the rise of China and local regional players (Iran, United Arab Emirates, Turkey, etc.) has become a popular topic in the world of foreign policy. But events in the Caucasus show that these global processes are not only negatively affecting the United States, but that even Russia may be the victim of changes in international power relations.

Top image: Soldier investigates the wreckage of a crashed Azerbaijani drone on October 13, 2020. Photo: Alex McBride / Getty Images