National Review
The new territory of Russia
In November, Russia acquired a detachment of someone else’s country. It is not done by strangers crossing the border, nor by hybrid warfare. Instead, the United States or the rest of the world, without question, negotiated its capture. The battle between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh preceded the alliance. The mountainous region is internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan, but the 1994 ceasefire between the two countries was controlled by the ethnic Armenians. Conflict erupted again in September. A peace deal was struck two months later with the Russian winner: he brokered a ceasefire that put the Kremlin’s seemingly peaceful shoes on the ground. America looked stupid the way it happened. Like Armenia’s traditional defender, Russia took the sole advantage of persuading Armenia to sign the ceasefire. By signing, Yerevan had abandoned claims to the occupied territories in Azerbaijan since 1994 and gained nothing – banning a ceasefire instead of forcibly surrendering. In exchange for the safety of a minor insult to his ally, Moscow received a present and presence. In reality – unless America is fully prepared to join the peace process – Nagorno-Karabakh is now for Russia’s indefinite period. The Kremlin has apparently controlled the area for five years, with an automatic rollover for an additional five, six months before the end of the mandate. Russia certainly will not. It is now the gateway to Europe’s center of energy diversification (reducing the role of Russian imports). If the region is strategically important to NATO, it makes it strategically important to the Kremlin. For the distrust of Azerbaijan, peacekeepers will want to stay. The short but ruthless conflict has finally proved that Armenia cannot win militarily, and so the ethnic Armenians must accept rule by Azerbaijan or by Russia’s defense. Weak and broken, Yerevan sees little insult to accepting Russian communities in Nagorno-Karabakh, if a hero is denied a complete victory. But for the people of Armen this is a long-term disaster. That means they are effectively trapped in the Russian embrace. They cannot turn west and turn east – either for diplomacy or for investment – because the Russians are now in charge. Traditionally considered by Moscow as “the other side”, “Azerbaijan” – due to the overwhelming support of the United States and the EU. In recent years – diplomatic and economic relations with Russia have been steadily deepening, partly due to the lack of requirements and serious options. Yet now, with Russian military boots on Azerbaijan territory for the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow’s advantage has also become an economic advantage: militarily guaranteeing a transport corridor in Armenia – closed before the ceasefire – Azerbaijan’s long-awaited The route controls from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean and Europe. The West could certainly be seen coming. It always starts this way: the toolhold soon morphs into footprints. Crimea, Eastern Ukraine, South Ossetia, Abkhazia – the list goes on. The Russian presence becomes Russian control: the only logic of Putin’s neo-Kazakh ambitions. Now, just weeks after the deployment, the Kremlin is maneuvering: the lines on the map are starting to bend and flex. On the website of the Russian Ministry of Defense, a page showing a map outlining the area where Russian peacekeepers are employed and in accordance with the terms of the agreement. On December 13, miraculously, the area they controlled was expanded. This was reversed the next day after diplomatic pressure from Azerbaijan. But this activity shows that Kremlin cartographers are becoming creative – and at the beginning of this intervention. Now rumors of Russian “passportization” are circulating in Nagorno-Karabakh. The creation of new demographic realities on the ground by granting citizenship has been used to maintain influence in the internal affairs of other post-Soviet countries. Once the Russians occupy the territory, the Russian state is obliged to take action. It’s a classic of Kremlin reporters. It predates the invasion of Crimea. It happened in two regions of Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, before the wars started, Russia emerged as the main beneficiary. Recently, passportization has been aggressively deployed in eastern Ukraine through the auxiliary streamlined process. The Kremlin predicts that by the end of the year, one million Russian citizens will have new mint documents. In all these circumstances, Russia’s grip is secure. Passportation means that the negotiated settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh final status – which in Soviet times was considered some form of autonomy in Azerbaijan – will never be completed. Instead it would turn into a Russian-passport protector, and give Russia an excuse – or in Moscow’s lexicon, a legal right – to jump into the field was an imaginary threat to its “citizens”. US-led aid will now be poured in. In the wake of Russian instability in Ukraine, it is surprising that no more precautionary measures are being taken in the South Caucasus. It is time for America to take action: a ceasefire will leave much to be desired for a final peace deal. to fix it. The U.S. must oppose full and widespread passportization. American companies should invest in infrastructure and energy projects in the region to limit Russia’s room for maneuver. And the US-led joint investment initiative between Armenia and Azerbaijan will help reduce both dependence on Russia. It is time for America to pursue diplomatic and economic endeavors and re-enter itself into this process. Otherwise, the Russian Empire will continue to expand unchecked.
