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“If we want to preserve strategic stability by using arms control as a counterpart to that, as a tool in that toolkit, then China should also participate.” – United States Secretary of Defense Mark Esper Defense NewsFebruary 26, 2020
For a person interested in throwing babies out of their bath water, only to later ask for their return, President Donald Trump risks giving the same treatment to the New START treaty. The new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, also known as the Strategic Offensive Arms Reduction and Limitation Measures Treaty, a creation of the Obama administration, will be renewed in February 2021.
Created to replace the 1991 START document, it limits long-range nuclear weapons programs for both the United States and Russia in terms of restricting the number of strategic nuclear delivery systems and the total number of nuclear warheads that can be used in those systems, backed by a verification regime and possible extensions for up to five years. The document is also the only significant nuclear arms control agreement remaining after the elimination of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.
New START has its fans in the political fraternity. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, arguing for its length, has noted that the treaty “contributes substantially to the national security of the United States by providing limits, verification, predictability and transparency about Russian strategic nuclear forces.” .
Frank G. Koltz, former undersecretary of energy for nuclear security, says he offers “important actions” to the United States military by imposing limits on Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and nuclear-armed heavy bombers at known and predictable levels. The verification regime also allows the USA. USA Achieve some degree of knowledge of Russian capabilities beyond traditional intelligence gathering methods. Taken together, these features of the treaty help reduce uncertainty regarding the future direction of the Russian nuclear forces, and therefore provide the US military with greater confidence in its own plans and capabilities. “
The verification regime should not be dismissed as mere theater. It has been taken seriously enough by both parties. As of August 2019, the two had exchanged something in the order of 18,500 notifications. US inspectors had conducted more than 150 on-site inspections in Russia. Without it, as Admiral Mullen asserts, “we would be flying blind.”
Despite such joy, both Moscow and Washington have shown, at various stages, a desire to renegotiate the deal. Cobwebs and crunches have developed. The Russian position on this has softened: renewal can take place without conditions. The Trump administration, on the other hand, has been hot on its heels. The document, for example, does not cover tactical nuclear weapons, an area in which Russia is doing quite well. (The Secretary of Defense of the United States, Mark Esper, calculates that the number of such devices is 2,000). Nor does it cover the nature of new nuclear supply systems, another area in which Russia is accused of standing out.
But it is the third point of discussion that Trump exercises the most: China. The renegotiation of the new START would make Beijing out of the ambitions of the US. USA From restricting another competitor, even if that competitor, in the scheme of things, is a relatively small beer, with 290 nuclear warheads (Russia and the United States have approximately 6,000 each). The person in charge of this Herculean mission and, in all probability useless, is the new envoy for arms control, Marshall Billingslea.
The PRC and its conduct in this field has become a strange fixation, according to Daniel Larison. Given that the PRC is subjected to a harsh and clever scourge for being the cause of COVID-19, bringing the PRC to nuclear negotiations before February 2021 will be a difficult task. Add to this China’s traditional refusal to engage in arms limitation talks, although the President would have him think differently, suggesting last December that Chinese officials “were extremely excited to get involved. … So some Very good things can happen regarding that. “
Specialists in the field of arms control believe that China would only reach any negotiating table if Moscow and Washington sacrificed something tangible and generally. President Obama’s Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, Rose Gottemoeller, at an event held in January by the Defense Writers Group, suggested intermediate-range restrictions on ground-launched missiles as a starting point, since that China is “looking at the possibility of a deployment of very capable US missiles of this type.” But the inescapable feeling when looking at Trump’s playbook regarding China’s potential admission is that it’s a huge distraction fueled to hide the desire to lead the new START span.
There is an obvious problem behind adding China to any expanded agreement. Even if Beijing were convinced to enter, the fewest nuclear weapons it possesses would lead to a rather bizarre result. Not being close to the Russian and American ceiling would be an incentive to build more weapons and systems. In doing so, Beijing would continue to abide by the letter of the agreement, a terribly ironic state of affairs for an instrument designed to limit, rather than expand, strategic nuclear arsenals.
Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge. He lectures at RMIT University in Melbourne. Email: [email protected]
