Power vacuum and the future of Chile post Piñera

Since October 2019, the shortage of political leadership that afflicts Chile has become evident. Part of the public discussion has focused on the situation, specifically, on President Sebastián Piñera’s weakness to fulfill his roles as head of state, head of government and leader of his coalition. Without falling into a “pinerization” of the analysis, it is necessary to think about the possible future scenarios from the present moment. For this, it is worth reflecting on how the ineffectiveness of political leadership at certain times can facilitate the emergence of power-concentrating presidencies in the following years. Latin America offers several examples from which some lessons can be drawn.

The Latin American context

In ArgentinaRaúl Alfonsín (Unión Cívica Radical) resigned from the presidency besieged by a prolonged economic recession, hyperinflation, without support in Congress, and being the subject of a high number of street protests. His exit was negotiated, for which the presidential election of 1989 was advanced, whose winner was the opposition candidate, Carlos Menem (Justicialist Party). Menem reformed the composition of the Supreme Court to have more influence on it, promoted one of the largest privatizations in Latin America, and agreed to the reform of the Constitution (1994), thanks to which he could be reelected in 1995. Menem spent 10 years in office power (1989–1999) and was only deterred from going for a third term as a result of the pressure he received from his own party. Then, in 2001, Argentina witnessed one of the most severe political, social, and economic crises in decades. In December of that year, President Fernando de la Rúa (Unión Cívica Radical) was forced to resign, cornered by anti-government mobilizations and in a climate characterized by everyone leaves! This crisis was followed by the election of Néstor Kirchner (2003–2007), who came to power after Eduardo Duhalde –– post De la Rúa interim president –– also stepped aside. Kirchner eventually handed over the presidential sash to none other than his wife, Cristina Fernández (2007–2015). The Kirchnerism He spent a total of 12 years in the Casa Rosada, to then return in 2019 under the leadership of Alberto Fernández as president and Cristina Fernández now as vice president.

For its part, Ecuador saw the rise of Rafael Correa, a stranger, who remained as president for a decade (2007–2017). His rise to power was preceded by three presidential crises: Abdalá Bucaram (1996–1997), removed from office after Congress declared his “mental incapacity”; Jamil Mahuad (1998–2000), overthrown by an indigenous-military uprising and replaced by Congress in the midst of a serious financial crisis; and Lucio Gutiérrez (2003-2005), who left office and fled the country during a political-institutional crisis. Thanks to the weakening of the already fragile Ecuadorian traditional parties and the commodity boom, Correa had a significant influence on domestic politics, especially on Congress. Among its most important achievements is a new Constitution approved via the constituent assembly. Similarly, Evo Morales in Bolivia He came to power in 2006, after Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (elected) and Carlos Mesa (interim) resigned from their positions in 2003 and 2005, respectively, amid strong social mobilizations against him. Morales removed restrictions on reelection, promulgated a new constitution through a constituent assembly, and was in power for three terms for a total of 13 years. The story is similar in Venezuela which witnessed the arrival of Hugo Chávez (1999–2013) after the collapse of the Venezuelan party system and the loss of legitimacy of the ruling elite. In this context of deep discrediting of traditional politics, Chávez appeared as the only politician willing and able to meet the needs of the Venezuelan people. The almost unchecked control exercised by Chávez –– and, later, by Nicolás Maduro (2013 – present) –– over the other powers of the State is widely known.

Finally, we have the case of Alberto Fujimori (1990–2000) in Peru. Fujimori came to the presidency in a scenario of loss of prestige for the political class, including the collapse of the party system, and preceded by poor government and economic management by the outgoing president, Alan García (1985-1990). Fujimori closed the Congress through the already known self-coup in 1992, an action that had high popular support, fostered a strong personalism centered on his figure, and governed under favorable economic conditions. Fujimori’s political influence in the 1990s was almost unrestricted. Fujimori only left power shortly after beginning his third term (2000) amid accusations of electoral fraud and when his administration was hit by the revelation of the already mythical vladivideos that showed his adviser, Vladimiro Montensinos, bribing Peruvian politicians.

The emergence of this type of power concentrating presidents seems to be preceded by three types of contexts: (a) government instability, in the form of “failed” presidencies (presidents who leave their positions early) or extremely weakened leaderships (Alan García in Peru), (b) collapse of the party system (Peru and Venezuela), and / or (c) severe economic crises. All the cases described derived from contexts of power vacuum (government instability or collapse of the party system), while only some of them were also accompanied by economic crises (hyperinflation or recession). It should be considered that, of the concentrating presidencies, those that amassed the least power are in Argentina (Menem and, later, the Kirchnerism), while in Venezuela (Chávez and, later, Maduro) the president has had overwhelming political influence. Additionally, all post-crisis presidents were characterized by high political personalization.

Lessons for Chile?

Fortunately, the situation in Chile –– from October 2019 to date –– has not been as severe as the cases examined above. The country is not going through an economic recession or inflationary crisis, the parties continue to carry out their functions, and President Piñera is still in office. However, the national panorama offers other nuances. First, there is no doubt that the economic scenario is not very optimistic as a result of COVID-19. Second, the traditional parties of both Chile Vamos, former Concertación, Partido Comunista, and the Frente Amplio are seriously delegitimized in the eyes of the public. The overwhelming result for choice Constitutional Convention above the Mixed Constitutional Constitution it clearly reflects a traditional anti-party and even anti-political mood. The party system in Chile is not close to collapse, but its parties do face serious problems of internal coordination and representativeness (see Luna y Toro column). Third, a clear weakening of the presidential figure is perceived. The indicators of support and popularity for President Piñera are historically low. Piñera’s presidency is, without a doubt, the weakest since 1990: the only one that has been the subject of massive and intense street protests (although the start of the mobilizations on October 18 did not target Piñera) and of a constitutional accusation. against him (the first in more than 60 years). Added to this is the growing fragility of its ministers, who have been repeated targets of opposition “attacks”. On the other hand, left and center-left opposition parties do not offer a clear, reliable and cohesive alternative to government. This absence of leadership in the opposition may help explain (partially) why Piñera has not been forced to leave his post early.

Finally, the question that arises is what the future holds for us, post Piñera. Part of the answer may lie in the latest polls that reflect ultra-fragmented preferences of the citizenry about who could be the next president of Chile (only a couple of “presidential candidates” slightly exceed the threshold of 10% in the polls). This is another symptom of the power vacuum left by the parties and increased by Piñera’s weak political leadership. The current scenario has the potential to facilitate the emergence of personalist leaderships that promise to save us from the parties and the “old politics”, leaderships that could try to concentrate power in the years to come. If so, it is expected that the courts, the parties from Congress, and the Comptroller’s Office –– actors that have historically been veto players (see more here) –– will try to stop the impulses of a president who concentrates power. The foregoing, naturally, would involve another cycle of tension and political instability in the country.