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In 2019, the National Chief of Criminal Intelligence, Peter Jacobs (pictured), recommended to National Commissioner Khehla Sitole that the unit be disbanded and the members be criminally charged. (Tracey Adams / ANA)
Jacobs’ 42-page affidavit offers a glimpse into the shadow world of Crime Intelligence and how the Secret Service Account has allegedly been abused, for decades, by officials for political and personal use.
SAPS crime intelligence chief Lt. Gen. Peter Jacobs and five fellow division officers are seeking urgent intervention from the Pretoria High Court to declare their suspensions illegal by National Commissioner Khehla Sitole.
Jacobs was the first to receive a notification of suspension on November 30, while fellow officers were notified on December 10, 2020.
“There was credible evidence available that the account was looted by various CFOs or division commissioners and other senior criminal intelligence officers,” Jacobs said in his 42-page document, exposing what he found in the division when he took command. in March 2018.
He explained how “parallel management systems” had been established within CI and that the Agents Program “was being abused by the placement of various officials and / or families and friends, with full pay for a prolonged period with little or no work” . to finish “.
Sitole instituted the suspensions, against the instruction of the Minister of Police Look Cele, in response to a preliminary report from the Inspector General of Intelligence, Setlhomamaru Dintwe, on alleged irregularities in the acquisition of PPE from the Secret Services Account.
The applicants in the matter are tThe South African Police Union, Jacobs, as well as his fellow brigade officers Albo Lombard, Section Chief of SAPS, Planning and Intelligence Monitoring; Colonel Isaac walljee, Acting Head of Section: Supply Chain Management; Colonel Manogaran Gopal, Section Chief Vehicle Fleet Management and Asset Management Secret Services Account – Supply Chain Management; Higher Lekalakala General Pharmacy, Acting head of the component and secret services account of the financial director; Colonel Read Matamela, Section Commander’s Secret Procurement Service Account
Respondents in civil matters are Cele, Sitole and Dintwe.
The suspensions effectively eliminated the entire upper chain of command of the criminal intelligence division, now under the sole command of the deputy commissioner, Lieutenant General. Surviving wife.
It’s no secret that Jacobs and Mfazi have disagreed since Mfazi’s appointment in March 2020 as Deputy National Commissioner responsible for Crime Detection.
Jacobs has accused Mfazi of workplace harassment that Jacobs reported to Sitole.
In the affidavit, Jacobs said the suspensions violated the Intelligence Oversight Act and should be set aside to allow everyone to return to their positions at Crime Intelligence.
The plaintiffs have asked the court not to deliberate on the merits of the suspensions, but on their legality in relation to the IOA.
“The illegality stems from the fact that our suspensions have their origin in a report or in some form of communication between the Office of the Inspector General of Intelligence (OIGI) and the National Commissioner.”
The report should have been delivered to Cele and a decision made by the Minister “on the veracity of the accusations contained in it before the National Commissioner could take any action.”
Jacobs revealed that Dintwe could, in fact, have been based on a report that did not exist.
“Any communication or compromise that arose between the IGI and the National Commissioner is not enough to trigger a disciplinary response from the National Commissioner.”
This “informal compromise,” Jacobs said, was not enough to trigger disciplinary proceedings.
Jacobs established in his affidavit the checks and balances that have been established in Crime Intelligence to stop the looting of the Secret Services Account.
How we got here
The CI head said that on November 4, the OIGI had delivered a letter to him about an investigation into the acquisition of PPE in the SAPS Criminal Intelligence Divisions with funds from the SSA.
Jacobs noted that he had responded to this letter stating that the acquisition “was not at odds with the purposes of the account” and that a circular had been received from the office of the Deputy Commissioner for Human Resources Management granting “permission to implement protocols” relevant to the Covid-19 pandemic.
“I also explained why the Open Criminal Intelligence Account was unable to provide PPE for personnel in the undercover setting. As a result, a limited budget of R 15 million was made available from the Secret Services Account for the purchase of PPE to be used in the Criminal Intelligence environment. “
The suspension of senior management was based “solely on the allegation that we use the Account to purchase PPE and that this is illegal.”
The account is established in terms of the SSA and has a separate budget vote that is assigned to CI as part of the intelligence community under the IOS.
The administration and use of the Account is governed by section 2 of the SSA.
Rendani Randela of the National Treasury wrote to SAPS and the National Commissioner as Accountant on June 24 regarding the division’s budget allocation.
The division was asked to use its current budget for Covid-19 expenses.
As a result, Lekalakala was left with the discretion to determine how much of the current budget should be used to ensure CI was Covid-19 compliant.
The limited amount was determined by account manager Nathan Naidoo. When the 15 million rand was closed, Jacobs said, “Lekalakala knew how many safe houses had to be serviced, how many officers needed PPE, etc.”
Lekalakala had enlisted the help of Brigadier Lombard to determine this amount. An information note signed by Lombard was written “with the full consent and knowledge of the CFO [Lekalakala] because the latter was in quarantine ”.
The note was a submission to protect an amount and did not seek spending authorization, Jacobs said.
“The briefing note was not in the least controversial. It was the basis on which spending on PPE was evaluated ”.
Lekalakala ordered Matamela to purchase PPE from the account.
Matamela submitted the request to Gopal to request R80,000 which was approved.
PPE was obtained from Tanciol Group as well as Harbor Protection Services
This was done by the Central Office and four provinces as separate and distinct transactions.
Sitole, in the suspension notice also accused Jacobs of discrediting SAPS, as he had signed a letter on November 13, 2020, stating that his office was aware of “factions within the division that are bent on viewing the Account. Secret Service associated with the dark days of embezzlement and corruption ”.
Cleaning operation
Jacobs explains how, at the time of his appointment, he had learned of the allegations and reports of abuse of the Secret Services account “due to political and personal conflicts.”
He had reviewed the documentation, including reports from the Auditor General and OIGI. The CI Agents Program and Intelligence Analysis and Coordination were also reviewed.
“The crucial IAC desk here for potential abuse was the TRA Threat and Risk Assessment desk in whose findings SAPS VIP Protective Services provide protection details such as blue lights and bodyguards for identified individuals.”
Jacobs said he had discovered that the former CFO, Maj. Gen. Nemuthenzela, had been suspended for more than a year and had faced multiple fraud and misuse charges, but that departmental investigations remained incomplete.
Also the Chief of Intelligence Collection of the National Component, Major General Deena Moodley, “had just returned from suspension for allegation of abuse of the Account and abusing his position by illegally or irregularly using a franchise financed by the Account as private residence “.
“The departmental investigation has not been completed here either,” Jacobs said.
The Head of Contra Intelligence and Security of the National Component, whom Jacobs did not mention in the court documents, was being investigated for “irregularly supervising and facilitating the training of security guards in the People’s Republic of China and use them for operational activities beyond the scope of job descriptions. “
From Death Squad to Dead Squad: Nhleko’s China-trained ‘secret agents’ stranded and fearful
In addition to this, Lekalakala had been transferred from Crime Intelligence to Visible Policing “on charges that could not be substantiated”.
“There was credible evidence available that the Account was looted by various CFOs or divisional commissioners and other senior criminal intelligence officers,” Jacobs said.
The account, he added, “had few or outdated management control policies or limited adherence to the already limited control policies that were in effect.”
Parallel management systems operated such as the fact that the Legal Support Officer operated a parallel Human Resources Management system “to the extent that in one case this resulted in the dismissal of an official by said legal officer.”
This was important, Jacobs emphasized, as “the power to remove members is only delegated to a Divisional Commissioner of Criminal Intelligence.”
He also cited another example of a parallel structure operating in the Western Cape “reporting to the Provincial Commissioner and not to me, through the National Division.”
The Agent Program, Jacobs said, “was being abused by the placement of various officials and / or families and friends, with full pay over an extended period with little or no work to be done.”
Former CI chief, and now convicted felon Richard Mduli, Jacobs said, had placed more than five of his family as undercover agents “with a comprehensive resource package, including a safe house, vehicles and technology per individual. ”.
Other “fake” agents were linked, Jacobs charged, “with highly influential people and some even refused to surface.”
Because of these findings, Jacobs said a Corporate Renewal Strategy had been developed “both to correct the irregularities found and to reorient the division towards a crime-fighting approach to insulate the organization against various corruption attacks.”
He said that Sitole could not circumvent the Intelligence Oversight Act and that the applicants “had the right to have the Minister exercise his discretion to influence the substance of the allegations.”
This could only be done by Cele once a final report from Dintwe had been provided.
The request was urgent, Jacobs said, as Sitole had indicated that CI members should be sanctioned through an expedited process.
“In terms of this process, we will simply be asked to present the reasons why we should not be fired and then if these presentations are not convincing, we will be fired.”
The plaintiffs sought to be “subject to legal suspension.” Jacobs said that the suspension of the CI officers “is related to the conflict I experienced in the implementation of measures for the correct administration of the Account.”
All of the suspended applicants were “key personnel charged with the responsibility of ensuring the effective functioning of central intelligence offices and, as such, their suspensions threaten to halt central intelligence operations,” Jacobs said.
“It is not that we proclaim that we are irreplaceable, but this team, as can be seen from their statements, has put processes and mechanisms in place to prevent abuse and exploitation of accounts.” DM
