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Attacks by suspected Islamic State-affiliated militants in Cabo Delgado indicate the extremists’ determination to seize a part of the country for themselves and establish a caliphate from which to plan and execute further attacks in Mozambique and southern Africa. (Photo: supplied)
If Mozambique finally accepts regional support, SADC must heed the hard lessons learned elsewhere on the continent.
First published by ISS TODAY.
On December 14, the President of Mozambique, Filipe Nyusi, called a troika meeting of the Policy, Defense and Security Body of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to discuss the situation in Cabo Delgado.
At the meeting, which was attended by the Presidents of South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe, as well as the Vice President of Tanzania, a specific role for SADC was not agreed upon. Instead, the main decision was to hold an extraordinary SADC summit in January 2021 to further discuss the issue.
The lack of a concrete plan is a symptom of Mozambique’s resistance to any kind of external support that could lead to multilateral foreign intervention in the country. But the January meeting is a sign that Mozambique may, at last, be willing to discuss regional support.
SADC faces an enigma. On the one hand, it must respond to the humanitarian catastrophe unfolding in Mozambique, which it condemns as terrorism. On the other hand, it seeks to protect Mozambique’s sovereignty and will not intervene unless the government requests it. So far, Mozambique has only requested SADC to provide military supplies.
The southern African region has never experienced terrorism of this magnitude in its postcolonial history. The intensity of the attacks shows the determination of violent extremists to seize a part of the country for themselves and establish a caliphate, or safe haven, from which to plan and carry out further attacks in Mozambique and the region.
This is not a crisis that one country can solve alone. Nyusi has announced his intention to eradicate violent extremists, but his government has been unable to do so for the past three years. Each day that passes strengthens the extremist resistance and complicates the liberation of Cabo Delgado and the millions of Mozambicans at risk. SADC must lead a regional response.
Any intervention must draw lessons from other African regions such as the Sahel, West Africa, North Africa and East Africa, where terrorism threatens lives on a daily basis. Some of the main problems encountered by Mali and Nigeria include a lack of comprehensive national and regional strategies, limited resources, and a focus on military action at the expense of human rights and development solutions.
Mozambique and SADC appear to be going a similar path. At first, the Mozambican government characterized the attacks as common violent crimes and not as acts of international terrorism, which one state cannot tackle alone. It also hired Russian and South African mercenaries to help fight the insurgency, rather than negotiating the collective support of neighboring countries.
Mozambique has also prioritized military operations over humanitarian, political and development responses, which must go hand in hand. The focus on security has led to the exclusion of community initiatives, particularly the use of local security groups that have proven to be of great help in stopping Boko Haram in some parts of northern Nigeria.
How SADC and Mozambique deal with the crisis will determine the future of terrorism in the region. A weak and indecisive response could cement an Islamic State caliphate in southern Africa, making outside intervention essential.
Whether SADC has the capacity to intervene is also a key question. Military expert Helmoed-Römer Heitman believes that SADC can change the dynamics on the ground: “SADC’s response can help protect borders and civilians and ensure that Islamists do not spread beyond Cabo Delgado,” he said. . ISS today.
However, no SADC member state has the military strength or financial capacity to launch a successful intervention. Heitman believes that current resources in the region can only sustain a short-term intervention and that SADC must address issues of force level and coherence, airlift capabilities, communication, and aerial reconnaissance equipment. The region will need the help of the international community, in particular the African Union (AU), the European Union, the United Nations and other development partners.
A possible SADC intervention could be based on several models, such as the one used by the G5 Sahel countries, the AU Mission in Somalia, the Joint Multinational Task Force against Boko Haram, the AU-led Regional Task Force against the Lord’s Resistance Army and the UN. Multidimensional integrated stabilization mission in Mali.
Dialogue efforts Through community organizations and religious institutions, which can help deconstruct extremist ideology, it should be an integral part of SADC’s response. A regional strategy also needs a maritime component to protect the means and the safety of navigation and maritime commerce along the east coast of Africa.
A comprehensive SADC plan must address humanitarian, security, political and economic challenges. It should negotiate access for international organizations that provide aid to internally displaced persons.
The cities of northern Mozambique under the control of violent armed extremists must be liberated. This is especially the case with the port of Mocímboa da Praia, which currently allows extremists to control coastal territories, access maritime resources, and operate their supply and communication lines.
A SADC strategy would need to secure Mozambique’s borders, especially with Tanzania and Malawi, and ask other neighbors to strengthen security and control of their borders with Mozambique.
Medium-term goals should include mobilizing international support to rebuild Mocímboa da Praia and other heavily affected districts in Cabo Delgado. Livelihoods, land redistribution and corruption in the area must be addressed, and reconciliation between communities and government must be facilitated.
Mozambique finally seems ready to accept SADC’s involvement in the crisis. The regional body must carefully calibrate its response, as long-term security in southern Africa depends on the success of collective action. DM
This article was produced by the South African team, ISS.
